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“No man in America, and few in our history, have been as 
qualified to sit on the Supreme Court as Robert Bork.” 
– President Ronald Reagan, 19871 
“Robert Bork’s America is a land in which women would 
be forced into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at 
segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break down 
citizens’ doors in midnight raids, schoolchildren could not 
be taught about evolution, writers and artists would be 
censored at the whim of government, and the doors of the 
Federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of 
citizens for whom the judiciary is often the only protector 
of the individual rights that are the heart of our 
democracy.” 
– Senator Edward Kennedy, 19872 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 1987, President Ronald Reagan nominated Judge Robert 
Heron Bork to replace retiring Justice Lewis Powell on the United States 
Supreme Court.3 For the next three months, the nation watched as a battle 
royale over this nominee played out in the nation’s media,4 within the 
nation’s law journals,5 and—most prominently—on the floor of the United 
                                                 
 1. Merrill Hartson, Reagan Predicts Bork Would Be a Great Supreme Court Justice, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 29, 1987), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1987/Reagan-Predicts-
Bork-Would-Be-A-Great-Supreme-Court-Justice/id-a6f33bfb15db4e2e83b813b135235d5f. 
 2. 133 CONG. REC. 18519 (1987) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy). 
 3. Gerald M. Boyd, Bork Picked for High Court; Reagan Cites His ‘Restraint’; 
Confirmation Fight Looms, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1987, at A1, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/1987/07/02/us/bork-picked-for-high-court-reagan-cites-his-restraint-
confirmation-fight-looms.html; see also Associated Press, Reagan Urges Fast Senate Action 
on Bork, L.A. TIMES (July 29, 1987), http://articles.latimes.com/1987-07-29/news/mn-4458_
1_robert-bork. 
 4. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Abortion, Bork and the ‘88 Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, July 
8, 1987, at A20; Ted Gest, A New Majority Moves to the Right, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, July 13, 1987, at 28–29; Richard Lacayo, The Battle Begins, TIME, July 13, 1987, at 
10–12; Aric Press & Ann McDaniel, Trying to Leave a Conservative Legacy, NEWSWEEK, 
July 13, 1987, at 22–23; Richard Vigilante, Who’s Afraid of Robert Bork?, NAT’L REVIEW, 
Aug. 1987, at 25–30. Actually, the fight began years earlier when Reagan and his advisors 
first began rumblings about possibly appointing Bork to the Court. See, e.g., Jamie Kalven, 
Robert Bork and the Constitution, NATION, Oct. 1, 1983, at 262–68 (acknowledging that 
Bork was a likely Supreme Court nominee and expressing horror at the notion that he might 
be confirmed). 
 5. In particular, the law review at the Benjamin Cardozo School of Law led the way 
in publishing the nation’s scholarly coverage of the Bork nomination. See generally Stephen 
Gillers, The Compelling Case Against Robert H. Bork, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 33 (1987); Gary 
B. Born, Robert H. Bork’s Civil Rights Record, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 75 (1987); Public 
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States Senate.6 Wave after wave of legal scholars rushed forth to assail or 
applaud the controversial jurist from Pittsburgh.7 Politicians revealed a 
level of emotion and investment typically found in a general election rather 
than a confirmation hearing.8 Even Hollywood got involved, with Gregory 
Peck narrating an advertisement aimed at blocking the sixty-year-old 
Bork’s appointment to the Court.9 At one particularly low point in the 
process, participants hauled Bork’s video rental history into the limelight, 
with observers hoping for some particularly salacious records disappointed 
that the judge had rented only bland films like A Day at the Races and The 
Man Who Knew Too Much.10 And so the process dragged on for weeks, as 
the nation—and particularly the Senate Judiciary Committee and the White 
                                                                                                                 
Citizen Litigation Group, The Judicial Record of Judge Robert H. Bork (1987), reprinted in 
9 CARDOZO L. REV. 297 (1987); U.S. Dep’t of Justice—Office of Public Affairs, A Response 
to the Critics of Judge Robert H. Bork, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 373 (1987). 
 6. Senator Kennedy’s remarks about back-alley abortions and segregated lunch 
counters, delivered a mere forty-five minutes after President Reagan announced Bork’s 
nomination to the Court, were just the beginning of the struggle in the Senate. An excellent 
account of the Senate debates and the personalities involved in those debates can be found in 
a book written by Boston Globe journalist Ethan Bronner that tracks Bork’s nomination 
battle from start to finish. ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK 
NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989). See also Linda Greenhouse, The Bork Nomination; In 
No Time at All, Both Proponents and Opponents Are Ready for Battle: Foes on the Left 
Strive for Unity, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1987, at A24 (“By the time President Reagan went 
before the television cameras last week to announce his choice for the Supreme Court, the 
campaign to persuade the Senate not to confirm Robert H. Bork was already well under 
way.”); Associated Press, Bork Gives Reasons for Continuing Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
1987, at 13 (noting that Bork, even in the face of almost certain defeat from the Senate, 
insisted on fighting to the bitter end and making the Senate quite literally vote him down).  
 7. The “Who’s Who” list of legal academics testifying about Bork’s nomination 
included Owen Fiss, Edward Levi, George Priest, David A.J. Richards, John Simon, Cass 
Sunstein, Kathleen Sullivan, and Laurence Tribe. The noted economist Thomas Sowell also 
testified at the hearings. See David A.J. Richards, Book Review: Originalism Without 
Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 1374 n.4 (1990); Linda Greenhouse, Legal 
Establishment Divided over Bork Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1987, at 33. 
 8. See Ayo Ogundele & Linda Camp Keith, Reexamining the Impact of the Bork 
Nomination to the Supreme Court, 52 POL. RES. Q. 403, 404 (June 1999) (stating that the 
Bork confirmation hearings “significantly raised the visibility of the confirmation process”); 
BRONNER, supra note 6, at 95 (“The idea of such a fight in the Senate was a new one. In the 
preceding half century a tradition had built up that the president had the power to nominate 
judges and the Senate’s job was to confirm them unless there were signs of gross 
incompetence or corruption.”). 
 9. The ad can still be viewed today. PFAWdotorg, 1987 Robert Bork TV Ad, 
Narrated by Gregory Peck, YOUTUBE (July 16, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
NpFe10lkF3Y. 
 10. This shocked enough people to spark the creation of a new law, the Video Privacy 
Protection Act, which forbade the general release of such information. See ENCYC. OF AM. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES at 1713 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006). 
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House—engaged in a tug-of-war over one of the most outspoken Court 
nominees in history.11 
When the bloodletting was finally over, the Senate had 
resoundingly rejected Bork’s nomination to the Court by a vote of 58–42.12 
It still stands as the largest margin of defeat for a Supreme Court nominee 
in the history of the United States.13 The whole emotionally, politically, and 
ideologically charged experience14 gave rise to a new verb in the English 
lexicon: “To bork,” essentially meaning “to attack a person’s reputation and 
views unfairly.”15 Bork resigned from his seat on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit just one year after his nomination to the 
Supreme Court was rejected, and remained indignant for the rest of his life 
about the process which he believed wrongfully denied him membership in 
America’s loftiest judicial club.16 
Angered by the Senate’s refusal of his nominee—an outrage likely 
augmented by surprise, given that his earlier Supreme Court nominations of 
Sandra Day O’Connor17 and Antonin Scalia18 had passed the Senate vetting 
process with apparent ease—Reagan vowed to strike back by appointing a 
carbon copy of Bork. “My next nominee for the Court will share Judge 
Bork’s belief in judicial restraint—that a judge is bound by the Constitution 
to interpret laws, not make them,” he announced on the day after the 
                                                 
 11. See Curtis J. Sitomer, Bork Presents Two Profiles: Sharp-Penned Scholar 
Emphasizes Judicial Restraint in Hearings, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 21, 1987), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0921/acurt.html. 
 12. Linda Greenhouse, Bork’s Nomination Is Rejected, 58–42; Reagan ‘Saddened’: 
Both Foes and Allies Ask Less Antagonism as President Picks a New Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 24, 1987, at 1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. For a good understanding of what precisely was at stake in this confirmation 
battle, at least from an ideological perspective, see Ronald Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 
THE N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 13, 1987, reprinted in 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 102 (1987) 
(“The Bork nomination is the climactic stage of a very different presidential ambition: to 
freeze [the Supreme Court], for as long as possible, into an orthodoxy of the President’s own 
design.”). 
 15. See David Brock, CNN Wheels Out Bork, Unchallenged, to Discuss “Borking,” 
MEDIAMATTERS FOR AM. (July 3, 2005), http://mediamatters.org/research/2005/07/03/cnn-
wheels-out-bork-unchallenged-to-discuss-bor/133443. In addition to Bork’s own definition, 
the Oxford English Dictionary added the verb “to bork” to their lexicon in March of 2002. 
Bork Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/
bork (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). 
 16. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 271–350 (1990) [hereinafter 
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA]; Robert Bork, Remarks at the National Press Club Luncheon 
(Sept. 6, 2005), http://press.org/news-multimedia/videos/cspan/188727-1. 
 17. O’Connor was confirmed unanimously, 99–0, in 1981. 1981 Year in Review, 
UNITED PRESS INT’L, http://www.upi.com/Archives/Audio/Events-of-1981/Reagan-Foreign-
Policy-Speach/OConnor-Appointed-to-Supreme-Court/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 18. Scalia was also confirmed unanimously, 98–0, in 1986. Kathy Kiely, Past 
Confirmation Votes, USA TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/
judicial/past-confirmation-votes.htm?csp=YahooModule_News (last updated Aug. 6, 2010, 
1:47 PM). 
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Senate’s vote.19 Five days later, his nomination of Douglas Ginsburg—
another conservative judge on the D.C. Circuit, although a jurist who at the 
time appeared to be much more reserved than Bork on many issues20—
seemed to follow through on that promise.21 
Yet just ten days after that, Ginsburg was gone too, withdrawing 
his name after the public discovered that he had smoked marijuana with his 
students at Harvard.22 After losing out on two nominees in a three-week 
span, the President appeared to temper his expectations of appointing a die-
hard “originalist” to the Court. On November 12, noting that “[t]he 
experience of the last several months has made all of us a bit wiser,”23 
Reagan nominated Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Anthony M. 
Kennedy to take over Powell’s seat.24 In a none-too-subtle gesture across 
the aisle, Reagan announced to the press that Kennedy “seems to be popular 
with many senators of varying political persuasions.”25 Evidently, truer 
words were never spoken. On February 3, 1988, the Senate confirmed 
Kennedy’s appointment to the Court by a unanimous vote.26 The battle to 
replace Powell was finally over. 
Twenty-five years later, though, questions still linger about what 
might have been, particularly in the wake of Bork’s recent death. Today, 
Kennedy is recognized as the “swing vote” on the Court,27 the least 
politicized member of an institution divided sharply along ideological 
lines.28 Presumably, Bork would not have echoed this record of 
                                                 
 19. Greenhouse, supra note 12. 
 20. See Ginsburg: Reagan Tries Again, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 2, 1987), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1987/1102/egins.html. 
 21. Reagan even alluded to that vow in his speech introducing Ginsburg to the general 
public. See Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Douglas H. Ginsburg to Be an 
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, II PUB. PAPERS 1252 (Oct. 29, 1987). 
 22. Steven V. Roberts, Ginsburg Withdraws Name as Supreme Court Nominee, Citing 
Marijuana ‘Clamor,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1987, at A1; John M. Broder, Collapse of the 
Ginsburg Nomination: At the End, Ginsburg Stood Alone—And Still a Puzzle, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 8, 1987), http://articles.latimes.com/1987-11-08/news/mn-21569_1_doug-ginsburg. 
 23. Linda Greenhouse, Reagan Nominates Anthony Kennedy to Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1987, at A1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. When asked by reporters whether he was upset to be Reagan’s third choice for 
the seat, Kennedy apparently wryly responded that he was “delighted with this nomination.” 
Id. 
 26. The total vote for Kennedy was 97–0. Past Confirmation Votes, supra note 18. 
 27. See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, What Will Justice Kennedy Do?, 
TIME, June 18, 2012, at 1; Dahlia Lithwick, Why Justice Kennedy Is Just Like America, 
SLATE (June 13, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/
06/justice_anthony_kennedy_holds_the_deciding_vote_on_many_of_the_supreme_court_s_
most_significant_cases_.html; Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly Influential Man 
in the Middle, WASH. POST (May 13, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/05/12/AR2007051201586.html. 
 28. See, e.g., Calabresi & Von Drehle, supra note 27 (“[Kennedy] is the decisive 
figure on a court that is otherwise divided between liberals and conservatives.”). 
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moderation—relatively speaking, anyway29—if he were on the bench. Yet 
the nation still does not truly know what would have happened if Bork, not 
Kennedy, were chosen to occupy this seat on the Court. With the Court 
deciding major cases on issues ranging from freedom of speech to abortion 
to affirmative action, the questions of what might have transpired if Bork 
actually were confirmed back in 1987 loom larger than ever. 
This Article tries to briefly attempt an answer. Part I examines the 
backgrounds of Judge Bork and Justice Kennedy, and then studies some of 
the major cases decided by the Court in four key areas—abortion, freedom 
of speech, the right to bear arms, and civil rights—during the last twenty-
five years. Part II then evaluates the voting record of Justice Kennedy in 
these cases, as well as the views held by Judge Bork—based on Bork’s own 
writings, on opinions that he rendered at the D.C. Circuit, and on 
commentaries written about him by other scholars—on these controversial 
topics. Part II also includes a discussion based on these records about how 
Judge Bork would likely have voted in these major cases, and analyzes how 
these cases would have turned out if Bork, not Kennedy, were sitting on the 
Supreme Court bench. While this Article is too short to examine every 
major case to come before the Court in the last quarter-century, it provides 
at least a bird’s-eye view of many of the leading disputes to come before 
the Court in this time and looks at how Bork might have influenced the 
outcome—and, by extension, the country’s entire direction on these 
matters. 
The decision of whether Bork’s likely impact on the Court would 
be as positive as President Reagan posited or as negative as Senator 
Kennedy asserted will be left in the hands of the readers. Instead, this 
Article is more empirical in nature. By looking at Bork’s own words, as 
well as comments made about him by knowledgeable observers, it will give 
the reader a sense of what might have been. Even more importantly, this 
study vividly illustrates the weight carried by each appointment and 
confirmation to the United States Supreme Court. As shown here, the 
presence or absence of just one individual on the Court has the ability to 
transform large swaths of America’s judicial landscape. With key vacancies 
on the Court potentially looming on the horizon, this is a lesson that all 
Americans should remember well. 
                                                 
 29. Notably, though, Kennedy still is twice as likely to vote the way that a 
conservative politician would vote. See Vincent M. Bonventre, Focus on Justice Kennedy 
(Supreme Court: How Partisan? Ideological? Activist?—with Graphs!), N.Y. COURT 
WATCHER (May 3, 2012), http://www.newyorkcourtwatcher.com/2012/05/part-2-focus-on-
kennedy-supreme-court.html. 
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I. THE MAKING OF TWO JUDGES: A BRIEF BACKGROUND  
OF JUSTICE KENNEDY & JUDGE BORK 
Before moving to a discussion of Bork’s possible impact on the 
Court, a brief pause is necessary to examine the heritage from which he 
came. Additionally, by way of comparison, it is likewise worthwhile to look 
at Justice Kennedy, the man who ultimately was confirmed for that 
Supreme Court seat. Given that a judge’s background can strongly 
influence his or her jurisprudence, this section provides an overview of both 
of these judges, their influences, and their journey to judicial prominence. 
A. Judge Bork 
Born into a middle-class family in suburban Pittsburgh,30 Robert 
Heron Bork showed no early inclinations of ever becoming a darling of 
ardent conservatives. As an adolescent, he proclaimed himself a Socialist.31 
This may have been nothing more than a teenager’s rebellious nature taking 
hold in a dominantly conservative region, but Bork has since stated that his 
early views were strongly influenced by British Marxist scholar John 
Strachey’s book The Coming Struggle for Power.32 Thus, by the time he 
graduated high school, Robert Bork apparently—and ironically—stuck out 
as a far left-wing radical.33 
According to Bork in later interviews, his political leanings began 
to shift during his short stint in the Marine Corps, which came at the very 
end of World War II.34 Yet the sea change occurred while Bork was 
attending the University of Chicago immediately after the war.35 At that 
time, the University of Chicago was beginning to carve out a niche as the 
leading proponent of “law and economics” judicial philosophy—the 
neoclassical notion that economic principles and methods should be used to 
properly assess the merits and effects of laws.36 Working closely with 
                                                 
 30. See Terence P. Jeffrey, Q & A with Judge Robert Bork: Moral Life of Nation 
Could Be Decided by One Judge, CNS NEWS (Jan. 19, 2009), http://cnsnews.com/news/
article/qa-judge-robert-bork-moral-life-nation-could-be-decided-one-judge. 
 31. Legends in the Law: A Conversation with Robert H. Bork, BAR REPORT (Dec.–Jan. 
1998), http://web.archive.org/web/20130401131335/http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/
resources/legends_in_the_law/bork.cfm. In this interview, Bork speaks of his earliest 
political debates, which took place late at night with his mother. He describes these 
discussions with his mother as “our own debating society.” Id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id.; see also Remarks at the National Press Club Luncheon, supra note 16. 
 34. See Legends in the Law: A Conversation with Robert H. Bork, supra note 31. 
 35. Id.; Remarks at the National Press Club Luncheon, supra note 16. 
 36. See generally Robin I. Mordfin & Marsha Ferziger Nagorsky, Chicago and Law 
and Economics: A History, THE RECORD (Fall 2011), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/
magazine/fall11/lawandecon-history (discussing, in the law school’s alumni magazine, how 
the law and economics movement in Chicago can actually be traced back to the school’s 
earliest years of existence). 
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professors who vigorously promoted a laissez-faire approach to 
governance, specifically a commercial marketplace free of government 
constraints, Bork’s ideology swung dramatically away from his early 
Socialist views.37 
In particular, Bork was impacted by the teachings of Aaron 
Director, the conservative economist who ardently argued that laws aimed 
at breaking up monopolies tended to hurt consumers rather than help 
them.38 Under the guidance of Director and other similarly inclined 
professors, Bork gave up his goal of becoming a labor union lawyer and 
decided to devote his attention to fighting antitrust legislation.39 
Bork worked briefly for a New York City law firm, and then 
returned to Chicago to work on antitrust cases for Kirkland & Ellis LLP.40 
From there, he accepted a professorship teaching antitrust law at Yale Law 
School.41 By his own estimation, he was the token conservative on the 
faculty.42 There, he developed a close friendship with the liberal professor 
Alexander Bikel, who became a frequent intellectual sparring partner.43 In 
the 1960s, however, Bork tired quickly of the “rebellions” taking place 
among the students on campus. “The classroom became a very tense place. 
You’d get almost no differences of opinion among the students,” he later 
told an interviewer. “They were more rigid in their attitudes, less willing to 
think, than any other group I’ve ever known.”44 
In 1972, President Richard Nixon appointed Bork as the Solicitor 
General in his administration.45 By this point, Bork had already made his 
mark working on Senator Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign in 1964, 
as well as working for Nixon in the 1968 and 1972 presidential elections.46 
When Bork accepted the Solicitor General’s post, however, he immediately 
                                                 
 37. See BRONNER, supra note 6, at 47 (“He switched, in effect, from true believer to 
true believer, attacking the ‘soft’ liberal center of American political theory, but from the 
opposite end of the spectrum.”). 
 38. Id. at 46–47. 
 39. Legends in the Law: A Conversation with Robert H. Bork, supra note 31. 
 40. Id. 
 41. In doing so, he gave up his $40,000-per-year job in Chicago for a $15,000-per-
year professorship. See David Beckwith, A Long and Winding Odyssey, TIME (Sept. 21, 
1987), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,965540,00.html. According to 
sources interviewed by Beckwith, Bork feared that continuing with Kirkland & Ellis would 
leave him with a bland, unfulfilling life, whereas academia could allow him to engage in the 
fierce scholarly debates that he loved. Id. 
 42. Legends in the Law: A Conversation with Robert H. Bork, supra note 31. 
 43. Id. Bork co-taught a Constitutional Law seminar with Bikel, during which the two 
professors “often shouted at each other for several hours, each exhibiting wilting wit.” 
BRONNER, supra note 6, at 56. 
 44. Legends in the Law: A Conversation with Robert H. Bork, supra note 31. 
 45. BRONNER, supra note 6, at 65. When Bork accepted the post, a group of his Yale 
students gave him a hard hat for a going-away present, symbolic of Bork’s tough, hard-line 
stances on legal principles. See Richard Lacayo, The Law According to Bork, TIME (Sept. 21, 
1987), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,965560,00.html. 
 46. BRONNER, supra note 6, at 52, 65. 
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became embroiled in the infamous Watergate scandal.47 It was he who 
ultimately carried out President Nixon’s controversial order to fire Special 
Prosecutor Archibald Cox when Cox demanded that Nixon produce certain 
tapes of conversations carried out in the Oval Office48—a duty which fell to 
Bork only after Nixon’s Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General 
both resigned rather than carry out the President’s order.49 Later, in the 
Senate confirmation hearings, Bork’s willingness to fire Cox resurfaced, 
with several commentators declaring that engaging in such an act revealed 
Bork’s unfitness to hold judicial office.50 
By the late 1970s, Bork was back at Yale,51 writing legal 
commentaries that were more outspoken than ever. His book The Antitrust 
Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, published in 1978, is still regarded as 
a groundbreaking work, arguing that intervention by the courts actually 
harmed consumers by shielding inefficient businesses, consequently 
causing market prices to rise.52 His other writings took similarly 
controversial stances, particularly with his opposition to civil rights 
measures such as affirmative action and anti-discrimination policies.53 
Still, Bork’s controversial writings did not prevent him from being 
confirmed to the D.C. Circuit bench in 1981.54 There, he joined a court that 
would ultimately include another University of Chicago disciple: Antonin 
Scalia, the longest-serving justice on today’s U.S. Supreme Court.55 Also 
on the D.C. Circuit at that time were two of the most famous liberal judges 
                                                 
 47. Id. at 65. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Bork and Watergate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 1987, at E23; Aaron Epstein, 2 Challenge Bork on Watergate, PHILA. INQUIRER 
(Sept. 30, 1987), http://articles.philly.com/1987-09-30/news/26208441_1_cox-dismissal-
judge-bork-challenge-bork; Bork Hearings Return to Role in Watergate, KNIGHT RIDDER, 
Sept. 30, 1987, in THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane, Wash.), at A3. In 1973, well before 
Bork was facing the Senate, his act of removing Cox from office was even deemed to be an 
obstruction of justice by the D.C. Circuit—the very court on which Bork would eventually 
sit. See Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (1973). 
 51. BRONNER, supra note 6, at 68–69. However, the second stint at Yale was evidently 
not as pleasant as the first. Many students and certain faculty members viewed him as 
“Nixon’s henchman” due to his role in firing Cox. Worse still, the death of Alexander Bickel 
evidently affected Bork deeply, and deprived him of his closest friend on the faculty. Id. at 
69. And worst of all, Bork’s wife, Claire, suffered from cancer during this period, dying in 
1980. Id. at 71, 73. 
 52. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
(1978). 
 53. See BRONNER, supra note 6, at 71–72 (stating that at this time, Bork’s writing 
began to reflect his evolving view that “egalitarianism went hand in hand with 
permissiveness.”). 
 54. See Remarks at the National Press Club Luncheon, supra note 16. 
 55. Scalia was appointed to the D.C. Circuit in 1982. RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE 
ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 34–35 (1997). By this point, though, 
Bork and Scalia already knew each other from discussions at the American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research. Id. at 23. 
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of that era: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, today one of the leaders of the Supreme 
Court’s liberal wing,56 and Patricia Wald, who would later go on to serve as 
the D.C. Circuit’s Chief Judge.57 Surprisingly, though, an analysis of Judge 
Bork’s voting record prepared by the Department of Justice in 1987 showed 
that he voted with the position taken by Ginsburg on 91% of cases and with 
the position taken by Wald on 76% of cases.58 
Bork served on the D.C. Circuit bench for just six years.59 The year 
after the Senate rejected him as Justice Powell’s Supreme Court 
replacement, he stepped down from the Circuit Court and returned to a 
largely academic life. His widely purchased writings from that point 
onward took on a largely moralistic tone, including his 1989 book The 
Tempting of America60 and two books in the 1990s, War in the Culture 
(1994)61 and Slouching Toward Gomorrah (1996).62 One of his last books, 
A Country I Do Not Recognize: The Legal Assault on American Values, 
continued with this theme of a corrupt judiciary injecting American society 
with shameful principles.63 In 2003, at the age of seventy-six, he converted 
to Catholicism.64 Until the final years of his life he served as a leader in the 
conservative Federalist Society,65 as well as a Distinguished Fellow with 
the Hudson Institute.66 He also served as co-chairman of Mitt Romney’s 
“Justice Advisory Committee” during Romney’s unsuccessful bid for 
                                                 
 56. Ginsburg was appointed to the D.C. Circuit in 1980. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
ACAD. OF ACHIEVEMENT, http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/gin0bio-1 (last revised 
Nov. 11, 2013 8:13 PM). 
 57. Wald was appointed to the D.C. Circuit in 1979. See Legends in the Law: A 
Conversation with Patricia M. Wald, BAR REPORT (Apr.–May 1995), available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20130401134318/http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/
legends_in_the_law/wald.cfm. 
 58. Response to the Critics, supra note 5, at 376. 
 59. See Robert H. Bork: Biographical Highlights, HUDSON INST., 
http://www.hudson.org/experts/42-robert-h-bork (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). 
 60. See THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 16. 
 61. ROBERT H. BORK, WAR IN THE CULTURE (1994). 
 62. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND 
AMERICAN DECLINE (1996) [hereinafter SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH]. The use of the 
name “Gomorrah” is a Biblical allusion, referring to a city that was destroyed by God for its 
wickedness. 
 63. A COUNTRY I DO NOT RECOGNIZE: THE LEGAL ASSAULT ON AMERICAN VALUES 
(Robert H. Bork ed., Hoover Inst. Press 2005). 
 64. Tim Drake, Judge Bork Converts to the Catholic Faith, NAT’L CATH. REG. (July 
20, 2003), http://catholiceducation.org/articles/catholic_stories/cs0048.html. 
 65. See A Conversation with Judge Robert H. Bork, The Federalist Society (June 26, 
2007), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubID.332/pub_detail.asp (containing a 
discussion that includes significant attention to Bork’s contributions to The Federalist 
Society). For a time, Bork served as the co-chair of the organization’s board of trustees. See 
Remarks at the National Press Club Luncheon, supra note 16. 
 66. See Robert H. Bork: Biographical Highlights, supra note 59. 
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President in 2012. It was Bork’s last turn in the public limelight before his 
death on December 19, 2012, at the age of eighty-five.67 
B. Justice Kennedy 
Compared to Robert Bork’s multiple moves and high-profile job 
changes, the life of Anthony McLeod Kennedy at first seems relatively 
bland. Until his confirmation to the Supreme Court, Kennedy spent most of 
his days in Sacramento, California, and exhibited little desire to ever 
leave.68 As a child, he was a self-described “nerd” who adopted the most 
mundane of lifestyles, apparently devoid of athletics, dating, and party-
going.69 Seemingly from the start, he fully adopted his family’s devout 
Catholicism,70 and enjoyed a very close relationship with his parents.71 In 
fact, his first job after attending school at Stanford, Harvard Law School, 
and the London School of Economics72 was as a lobbyist for his father’s 
Sacramento law firm.73 
In 1965, he began teaching at the McGeorge School of Law at the 
University of the Pacific, a post that he held until his U.S. Supreme Court 
appointment in 1988.74 There, he became friends with the Dean of 
McGeorge School, Gordon Schaber,75 who at the time was the youngest law 
school dean in America.76 Later, when Kennedy realized that Schaber was 
                                                 
 67. See Ethan Bronner, A Conservative Whose Supreme Court Bid Set the Senate 
Afire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2012, at A1; Al Kamen & Matt Schudel, Robert H. Bork, 
Conservative Judicial Icon, Dies at 85, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2012), http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2012-12-19/local/35929283_1_judicial-restraint-conservative-jurist-
judge-bork; Lloyd Grove, Robert Bork’s Romney Connection, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 17, 2011), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/10/16/robert-bork-on-romney-obama-and-
biden.html. 
 68. See Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 2005), http://
www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/09/12/050912fa_fact; Calabresi & Von Drehle, supra 
note 27; Lithwick, supra note 27; Barnes, supra note 27. 
 69. Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader: The Arrogance of Anthony Kennedy, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC (June 16, 2007), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/supreme-leader-the-
arrogance-anthony-kennedy. 
 70. See Calabresi & Von Drehle, supra note 27. In the words of one of Kennedy’s 
childhood acquaintances: “He and I were altar boys together, and I can’t count how many 
times I would say something, or I was going to do something, and he would say, ‘That’s a 
sin.’” Id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id.; see also Toobin, supra note 68. 
 73. Toobin, supra note 68 (stating that when Kennedy’s father passed away, Kennedy 
immediately took over his father’s practice). 
 74. Calabresi & Von Drehle, supra note 27. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Gordon Schaber, Dean of School of Law, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 1997), http://
articles.latimes.com/1997/nov/08/news/mn-51544. 
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gay, their friendship survived, despite the tremendous social taboo placed 
on homosexuality in that time period.77 
During the early 1970s, Kennedy worked for Reagan—who was at 
that time the Governor of California—on a variety of issues, including 
drafting tax cut legislation for the state.78 Then, in 1975, Reagan appointed 
Kennedy to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.79 During his time as a 
Ninth Circuit judge, Kennedy displayed the philosophical flexibility for 
which he is presently known on the Supreme Court. One of his clerks stated 
that Kennedy would “try on” opinions as if they were hats, never entirely 
satisfied with a particular look.80 
Since the Ninth Circuit held court in California, Kennedy was able 
to continue living in the same suburban home where he had spent his 
childhood years.81 So it came as no great surprise that when Reagan wanted 
a less controversial nominee after the debacles with Bork and Douglas 
Ginsburg, he called upon his fellow Californian with the quiet, steady, boy-
next-door image for the job.82 As one author later wrote, “Kennedy was 
depicted in the national media at that time as a man who virtually stepped 
out of a Norman Rockwell painting, a conservative federal judge and 
devout Catholic with a schoolteacher wife from a mid-size provincial town 
in Northern California.”83 
Still, Kennedy is anything but provincial. In addition to his 
education in London, he once possessed a license to practice law in Mexico, 
served in the 1970s as the supervisor of courts in America’s South Pacific 
territories, and advised the Chinese government on improvements to their 
court system.84 Today, he is a frequent speaker at international judicial 
conferences and teaches an annual seminar in Salzburg.85 Perhaps due to 
this global exposure, he frequently cites treaties, foreign court decisions, 
                                                 
 77. Calabresi & Von Drehle, supra note 27. People have speculated that Kennedy’s 
longstanding friendship with Schaber could be at the core of Kennedy’s propensity to rule in 
favor of homosexuals in civil rights cases. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. At age thirty-eight, Kennedy was the youngest Court of Appeals judge in 
America at that time. Id. 
 80. Id. This statement was made by Alex Kozinski, Kennedy’s first clerk on the Ninth 
Circuit and, as of the date of this publication, the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit. 
 81. Toobin, supra note 68. 
 82. See supra notes 23–26 & accompanying text. 
 83. Melinda Welsh, Sacramento’s Supreme: Will Anthony Kennedy halt or advance 
the rightward swing of the U.S. Supreme Court?, NEWSREVIEW.COM (Oct. 4, 2007), http://
www.newsreview.com/sacramento/sacramentos-supreme/content?oid=574071. 
 84. Toobin, supra note 68. 
 85. Calabresi & Von Drehle, supra note 27; Toobin, supra note 68. 
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and other non-U.S. sources in his Supreme Court opinions86—a practice for 
which he has been both praised and pilloried.87 
Overall, Justice Kennedy appears to be an enigmatic individual, 
both on and off the bench. In direct contrast to Bork, he rarely articulates 
concrete theories about the law or about any particularly controversial legal 
issues. Nor has he ever written a book about “good judging” or any other 
topic specifically pertaining to his judicial career. Yet because of his 
mercurial nature, and because of his propensity to cross “party lines” in his 
judicial opinions, he has become the Court’s most unpredictable justice.88 
As Time Magazine put it in an extensive cover story about him, “The fate 
of America’s biggest issues rests with Justice Kennedy and his take on the 
Constitution.”89 
On the whole, Bork and Kennedy traveled markedly distinct paths 
to reach their judicial careers. The issue to which this Article now turns, 
though, is whether their decisions from the Supreme Court’s bench would 
have been as divergent as their often-contrasting heritages and lifestyles 
seem to suggest. 
II. ISSUES & LIKELY OUTCOMES: HOW THE COURT PROBABLY WOULD 
HAVE CHANGED WITH “JUSTICE BORK” INSTEAD OF JUSTICE KENNEDY 
Without question, Bork and Kennedy evolved from noticeably 
different backgrounds. The question facing this Article, though, is whether 
Justice Kennedy’s take on the Constitution is diametrically opposed to the 
conclusions that Robert Bork would have reached. This discussion now 
moves to an examination of whether their judicial decision-making on 
matters before the Supreme Court would have intersected more than it 
diverged. 
                                                 
 86. See Toobin, supra note 68 (discussing Kennedy’s substantial use of foreign 
legislation, international instruments such as the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, and decisions by international tribunals like the European Court of Human 
Rights in deciding some of America’s most controversial cases). 
 87. See, e.g., David G. Savage, A Justice’s International View, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 
2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/14/nation/na-scotus14 (noting praise by noted 
law professor Michael Dorf for Kennedy’s use of international opinions in his decisions, but 
also describing criticism from a member of the Ethics & Public Policy Center about 
Kennedy’s belief that “the Constitution needs to be redefined in accord with international 
norms”); Calabresi & Von Drehle, supra note 27 (describing how Kennedy’s decisions 
involving international law “drew fire from his conservative colleagues”); Toobin, supra 
note 68 (“Kennedy’s reliance on foreign sources has prompted a vigorous backlash, both on 
and off the Court”); Rosen, supra note 69 (“He has infuriated conservatives by citing 
evidence of purported international consensus in his opinions, provoking some Republicans 
to call for his impeachment.”). 
 88. See supra notes 27 & 87. 
 89. Calabresi & Von Drehle, supra note 27. 
234 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1: 221 
A. Abortion 
During the confirmation hearings for both Bork and Kennedy, 
abortion was arguably the hottest of all hot-button topics.90 Paramount in 
the minds of the Senators, as well as most outside observers of the hearings, 
was whether the new appointee to the Court would be inclined to overrule 
Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision recognizing that a woman had a 
constitutionally protected privacy right to have an abortion.91 
Over the course of the past twenty-five years, the Court has granted 
certiorari to several cases in which overruling Roe v. Wade was a distinct 
possibility. However, it has never done so. Instead, the Court has issued 
decisions refining and defining the scope of Roe, and arguably limiting its 
reach. Yet the extremely divisive decision still stands.92 
Between 1987 and the present, some (but certainly not all93) of the 
major abortion decisions rendered by the Supreme Court include: 
 
• Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, upholding a 
Missouri state law forbidding the use of public facilities for 
abortions, unless the abortion was necessary to save the 
woman’s life.94 
 
• Hodgson v. Minnesota, upholding a state law requiring 
minors to notify both parents before obtaining an 
abortion.95 
 
• Rust v. Sullivan, finding that the federal government could 
constitutionally prevent recipients of funds designated for 
                                                 
 90. For examples of the extremely polarizing affect this debate had on the 
confirmation hearings, see supra notes 3–6. 
 91. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Officially, Roe v. Wade established a balancing test for 
determining whether a law forbidding an abortion was constitutional. Id. Blanket bans on 
abortions were deemed unconstitutional as a due process violation of a woman’s right to 
privacy. See id. at 164. However, the Court also held that narrowly tailored laws prohibiting 
abortions later in the woman’s pregnancy could be upheld, provided that they reinforced the 
State’s compelling interest in protecting the health of the mother and/or protecting the 
unborn but developed fetus. Id. at 164–65. The specific point when a state can step in and 
prohibit an abortion without unconstitutionally violating the woman’s right to privacy 
remains a source of much controversy today. 
 92. The core of Roe v. Wade was controversially upheld as constitutional in the 1992 
case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, described in some detail below. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 93. In this section, and in all the sections of this Article, I recognize the impossibility 
of scrutinizing every important case in a specific area of the law, particularly such fertile 
areas as are discussed here. With this in mind, I have tried in each section to pick “highlight” 
cases that were decided by a divided Court and that focus on some major facet of the area of 
law at issue. Where possible, I have also tried to select cases where Justice Kennedy played 
an especially significant role in the outcome. 
 94. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 95. 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 
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“family planning services” from using those funds for 
abortion counseling.96 
 
• Planned Parenthood v. Casey, determining that the Court 
would not overrule Roe v. Wade, but upholding the portion 
of a Pennsylvania statute requiring a twenty-four hour 
waiting period before receiving an abortion as consistent 
with due process.97 
 
• Gonzales v. Carhart, establishing that a federal law 
banning partial-birth abortions was constitutional, even 
though this law lacked a provision allowing the procedure 
when the health of the mother was at risk.98 
1. Where Kennedy Stands 
In several of these cases, Justice Kennedy took an extremely active 
role. For instance, in the divisive Planned Parenthood matter, Kennedy 
joined with Justices O’Connor and Souter to form the controlling three-vote 
plurality in the case.99 It was their decision that preserved Roe v. Wade over 
the vehement objections of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice 
Thomas, and Justice White.100 And it was also the Kennedy–O’Connor–
Souter holding that carved out a new test for the constitutionality of 
abortion laws: the “undue burden” standard.101 Under this analysis, the 
Court’s key question in abortion cases became whether the law in question 
imposed an “undue burden”102 upon the woman’s constitutionally protected 
privacy interest.103 This was a departure from the standard in Roe, yet still 
affirmed the Roe decision as good law.104 Under this standard, the 
                                                 
 96. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 97. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 98. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). This case overruled the 2000 decision of Stenberg v. 
Carhart, in which the Court held that the government could not ban doctors from performing 
partial-birth abortions. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). The likely cause of this discrepancy between 
2000 and 2007: the replacement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who voted with the 
majority to strike down the partial-birth abortion ban in Stenberg, with Justice Samuel Alito, 
who voted to uphold the ban in 2007. 
 99. See 505 U.S. at 843–901. 
 100. In short, these dissenters argued that because the Constitution was silent on a 
woman’s right to an abortion, and because “longstanding traditions” of American society 
have permitted abortions to be outlawed, there was no such thing as a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in an abortion. See id. at 944–78 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); 979–
1002 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. at 874–79. 
 102. This could be an undue burden intended by the state law, or an unintentional 
undue burden resulting from the overall effect of the law at issue. See id. 
 103. See id. at 878. 
 104. Id. at 879 (“Our adoption of the undue burden analysis does not disturb the central 
holding of Roe v. Wade, and we reaffirm that holding.”). 
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Kennedy–O’Connor–Souter plurality found that the Pennsylvania 
requirement that a woman notify her husband prior to seeking an abortion 
was an undue burden on the woman’s privacy right to an abortion.105 The 
state’s demand for a twenty-four hour waiting period before the abortion 
procedure could be performed, however, was not deemed to be an undue 
burden on the woman’s right to an abortion, and thus was upheld.106 
In Gonzales, Kennedy authored the opinion of the Court.107 
Observers who had read Stenberg v. Carhart, the case in which the Court 
had previously struck down a partial-birth abortion ban,108 probably were 
not surprised at the tone of Kennedy’s commentary on this issue. Kennedy, 
joined by Rehnquist,109 had written a rather lengthy dissent in Stenberg, 
arguing that the interests of the unborn child outweighed the privacy right 
to an abortion in partial-birth abortion cases.110 He went on to explain that 
the partial-birth abortion ban proscribed a specific type of abortion, but 
“deprived no woman of a safe abortion and therefore did not impose a 
substantial obstacle on the rights of any woman.”111 Predictably, his opinion 
for the Court’s majority in Gonzales upheld the partial-birth abortion ban 
along much the same lines.112 Again, though, he emphasized that he was not 
following the direction of the concurring opinion authored by Thomas and 
joined by Scalia, which held that a woman simply had no constitutional 
right to an abortion and thus the issue was easily resolved.113 
With regard to the other cases, Kennedy joined Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion in Webster, affirming the Missouri statute but rejecting the 
chance to re-visit Roe v. Wade.114 He concurred with the majority in 
Hodgson, affirming the state law requiring minors to notify both parents 
before having an abortion.115 And he joined the majority opinion written by 
Rehnquist in Rust, allowing the federal funding for “family planning” to be 
limited so that it was not used for abortion counseling.116 
                                                 
 105. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 887–98. 
 106. See id. at 885–87. This three-justice plurality also concluded that a parental 
consent requirement under the Pennsylvania law for “unemancipated” women under the age 
of eighteen also was constitutional, as it did not impose an undue burden on these women in 
seeking an abortion. See id. at 899–900. 
 107. 550 U.S. 124, 132–68 (2007). 
 108. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 109. Id. at 957–79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). As a side note, it appears that Kennedy 
and Rehnquist frequently voted the same way during their time on the Court. While this 
Article certainly is not an exhaustive study of the overlap in their voting patterns, even a 
cursory glance at the cases discussed here reveals Kennedy and Rehnquist voting the same 
way and even joining each other’s opinions at what appears to be an exceptionally high rate. 
 110. In particular, see id. at 970–75. 
 111. Id. at 965. 
 112. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 167–68. 
 113. See id. at 167–69. For the short but pointed concurring opinion by Thomas, see id. 
at 168–69. 
 114. 492 U.S. 490, 520–22 (1989). 
 115. 497 U.S. 417, 480–501 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 116. 500 U.S. 173, 201–03 (1991). 
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2. Where Bork Stood 
One can sum up the essence of Robert Bork’s views on abortion by 
reading a single passage from his book Slouching Toward Gomorrah: 
It was argued that abortion on demand would guarantee 
that every child was a wanted child, would keep children 
from being born into poverty, reduce illegitimacy rates, and 
end child abuse. Child poverty rates, illegitimacy rates, and 
child abuse have soared. But it is clear, in any event, that 
the vast majority of all abortions are for convenience.117 
In an effort not to belabor the point, suffice it to say that Robert Bork was 
not a proponent of finding any sort of a constitutional right to an abortion. 
Since seemingly the day after Roe v. Wade was decided, his writings and 
speeches attacked the case and its progeny,118 as well as the very practice of 
abortion.119 The more fundamental question, though, is this: Would Bork, 
despite his obvious distaste toward abortion, nevertheless have voted to 
uphold Roe v. Wade out of deference to stare decisis, the doctrine requiring 
that precedent must be upheld unless there is a blatant reason to overrule 
it?120 
                                                 
 117. SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH, supra note 62, at 180 (emphasis added). 
 118. For a thorough review of Bork’s commentaries about abortion up to the time of his 
Senate confirmation hearings, see Gillers, supra note 5, at 43–47. For other, more recent 
statements by Bork about abortion, see, for example, Robert Bork, Keeping a Republic: 
Overcoming the Corrupted Judiciary, THE INSIDER, Spring 2010 (adapted from a speech 
delivered at the Joseph Story Lecture for The Heritage Foundation), Oct. 15, 2008, available 
at http://www.hudson.org/research/7063-keeping-a-republic-overcoming-the-corrupted-
judiciary (referring to abortion as a “wholly fictitious” right created by activist judges on the 
Supreme Court); Robert Bork, Barak’s Rule, AZURE, Winter 2007, available at http://web.
archive.org/web/20130415205455/http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
publication_details&id=4389 (accusing the Court of inventing “a general, undefined right of 
privacy” and thereby illicitly re-writing the Constitution); THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra 
note 16, at 8 (stating that the Court “found a right to abortion in the Constitution without 
ever explaining even once how that right could be derived from any constitutional 
materials”); Jeffrey, supra note 30 (quoting Bork as stating that “The legislatures were not 
about to rule for abortion on demand, which is what the court did.”). 
 119. See Robert H. Bork, Inconvenient Lives, FIRST THINGS, December 1996, at 9–13. 
In this essay, Bork remarked that “Americans do not view human life as sacrosanct,” and 
blamed this on “radical individualism,” then stated that “there are severe moral problems” 
regarding the act of abortion. Id. at 9, 11. Abortion, he wrote, is a matter of “killing unborn 
children for convenience.” Id. at 13. Bork also hypothesized that abortion is the first step 
toward a society that allows killing of elderly individuals when they become socially 
expendable. Id. “If it is permissible to kill the unborn human for convenience,” he stated, “it 
is surely permissible to kill those thought to be soon to die for the same reason. And it is 
inevitable that many who are not in danger of imminent death will be killed to relieve their 
families of burdens.” Id. 
 120. In other words, Bork could conceivably decide that even though he dislikes the 
practice of abortion and the case that constitutionalized it, he owes a duty of “judicial 
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It appears to be quite clear that Bork would never have deferred to 
precedent regarding Roe v. Wade. Testifying before Congress in 1981, he 
proclaimed that Roe was “a serious and wholly unjustifiable usurpation of 
state legislative authority.”121 He castigated the decision in most of his 
books and articles, typically using it as his primary exhibit of how “activist 
judges” create constitutional rights that never actually appeared in the 
Constitution.122 In one speech in 2010, he announced that Roe had 
“invented a wholly fictitious right to abortion.”123 “Though they have tried 
desperately,” he continued, “nobody, not the most ingenious academic 
lawyers nor judges, in the thirty-six years since it was decided has ever 
managed to construct a plausible legal rationale for Roe, and it is safe to say 
nobody ever will.”124 
There is, however, one unexpected wrinkle in Bork’s views on 
abortion. In 1981, despite denouncing Roe v. Wade in his testimony before 
Congress, Bork went on to oppose the notion of a “Human Life Bill.”125 
Among other things, the Bill defined “life” as beginning from the moment 
of conception.126 Had the Bill passed into law, this definition alone would 
have dramatically called into question the holding in Roe.127 To the surprise 
of his supporters, though, Bork spoke out against the Bill.128 In essence, he 
argued that it would be wrong for Congress to pass a law abridging a 
freedom that the Supreme Court had held to be a constitutionally protected 
right.129 Ultimately, the Bill was never passed. 
However, it still appears unlikely that Bork’s refusal to support the 
Human Life Bill would signal his reluctant acquiescence to the precedent 
                                                                                                                 
restraint”—a philosophy that Bork has praised—to follow the Court’s prior ruling in this 
matter and not remove a right that the Court has previously recognized. 
 121. See William F. Buckley, Jr., Understanding Bork, UNIVERSAL PRESS (June 10, 
1981), http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1696&dat=19810610&id=1uEeAAAAIBAJ
&sjid=NUcEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5583,2123702; see also Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, The Ugliness All 
Started with Bork, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/
opinion/nocera-the-ugliness-all-started-with-bork.html. 
 122. See supra note 118. 
 123. Keeping a Republic, supra note 118. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See LEONARD GROSS & NORMAN VIEIRA, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS: JUDGE 
BORK AND THE POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 69 (1998); LEGAL RIGHTS: 
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 187 (Thomas R. Kearns & Austin Sarat, eds., 
1997); Buckley, supra note 121. 
 126. See Buckley, supra note 121. 
 127. See, e.g., GROSS & VIEIRA, supra note 125, at 69. 
 128. See supra note 125. 
 129. The Human Life Bill: Hearing on S.158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of 
Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 309–11 (1981) (statement of Prof. 
Robert Bork, Yale Law School, New Haven, Conn.). Notably, and perhaps humorously, 
Bork objected to this bill in a manner that also critiqued the Supreme Court. See id. He 
testified that the Human Life Bill would be an act of overreaching by Congress that would 
change “the constitutional function of the courts as we have known it since Marbury v. 
Madison.” Id. at 311. He then went on to add that such overreaching actually would be “no 
more drastic than what the judiciary has accomplished over the past 25 years.” Id. at 310. 
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set by Roe. While Bork protested the notion of Congress overturning the 
Court’s determination of constitutionality, it appears that he would have 
had no qualms about the Judicial Branch reversing this decision. Tellingly, 
in a 2003 interview, Bork stated that “if the Court makes a bad mistake 
about the Constitution, nobody can cure it except the Court.”130 Clearly, 
Bork views Roe v. Wade as precisely that: “a bad mistake about the 
Constitution.”131 There seems to be little doubt that if he were on the Court, 
he would wield his judicial authority to “cure it.” 
3. The Bork Effect 
Given this look at Bork’s views on abortion, it appears that he 
would almost certainly have differed from Kennedy’s reluctance to re-visit 
Roe v. Wade.132 Thus, in Webster, Bork would have voted not only to 
uphold the Missouri statute, but to explicitly declare that there is no 
recognizable constitutional right for a woman to have an abortion.133 This 
would be a far broader decision than the Court’s majority authored by 
Rehnquist and joined by Kennedy, among others, in this case.134 He would 
have joined Scalia’s partial concurrence, arguing as Scalia did that the 
Court should use this case to overrule Roe “more explicitly” than what the 
majority was willing to do.135 
Likewise, Bork would have agreed with the results in Hodgson, 
Rust, and Gonzales, but would have likely called for all three to be cases in 
which the constitutionalized right to an abortion was eliminated once and 
                                                 
 130. Peter Robinson, Robert’s Rules of Order: A Conversation with Robert Bork, 
UNCOMMON KNOWLEDGE (July 16, 2003), http://www.hoover.org/multimedia/uncommon-
knowledge/27065. 
 131. For convincing evidence of this viewpoint, see supra notes 118 & 121. 
Interestingly, Bork also defended the right of a state to ban contraception. See THE TEMPTING 
OF AMERICA, supra note 16, at 95. He referred to Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme 
Court decision that overturned a Connecticut law that prohibited contraceptive use by 
married couples, as being “utterly specious” and a “constitutional time bomb.” Id. 
Conversely, Anthony Kennedy defended Griswold and the recognition of a constitutional 
right to privacy in his Senate confirmation hearing. See Linda Greenhouse, Echo of ’87 Bork 
Uproar Rings Softly in Abortion Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 1989), http://www.nytimes.
com/1989/04/28/us/the-law-echo-of-87-bork-uproar-rings-softly-in-abortion-debate.html. “It 
was [Kennedy’s] eloquent statement in support of the constitutional right to privacy at his 
confirmation hearing that, as much as any factor, made him acceptable to the Senators who 
had found Judge Bork unacceptable,” Greenhouse wrote. Id. 
 132. As noted earlier, Kennedy’s reluctance to re-visit Roe was on clearest display in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, but also was particularly evident when he joined Rehnquist’s 
decision in Webster. See supra notes 99–104, 114. 
 133. This would clearly follow Bork’s expressed views on abortion laws. See supra 
notes 118 & 121. 
 134. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520–22 (1989). Rehnquist’s 
opinion was also fully joined by Justice Byron White. 
 135. Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
240 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1: 221 
for all.136 This viewpoint would have the greatest impact on the fragmented 
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Rather than venturing down the 
road of the “undue burden test” articulated by Kennedy, O’ Connor, and 
Souter,137 Bork would have once again demanded that Roe be destroyed 
completely rather than being dismantled “doorjamb by doorjamb.”138 
This time, though, Bork’s trumpet blast would have sent the walls 
tumbling down. Without Kennedy on the Court, the opinion held by 
O’Connor and Souter would have lacked the third vote needed to make it a 
controlling plurality. Instead, Bork’s vote to strike down Roe would have 
given five votes to the opinion written by Scalia and joined by Rehnquist, 
White, and Thomas—an opinion holding that a woman’s decision to abort 
her unborn child is not a constitutionally protected interest.139 Bork’s vote 
would have turned Scalia’s most stinging line—”We should get out of this 
area, where we have no right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor 
the country any good by remaining”140—from an angry dissent into a 
majority opinion. In short, with Bork on the Court rather than Kennedy, 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey would be remembered by posterity as the 
case that overruled Roe v. Wade and eliminated the constitutional right to 
an abortion from American jurisprudence. 
B. Freedom of Speech 
During the last quarter of a century, and particularly during the 
years when John Roberts has served as Chief Justice, many of the Supreme 
Court’s most highly publicized decisions have been in the free speech 
arena.141 Not surprisingly, Bork’s views about the Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment also took center stage for much of the debate surrounding 
                                                 
 136. Again, this is consistent with Bork’s views on Roe v. Wade and subsequent case 
law arising from this decision. See supra notes 118 & 121. It is also further than the majority 
was willing to go on these three cases. However, this viewpoint did receive support from 
Scalia in Hodgson, and from Thomas and Scalia in Gonzales. Hodgson v. Minn., 497 U.S. 
417, 480 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168–69 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 137. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843–901 (1992). 
 138. Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 139. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). With Bork on the Court instead of Kennedy, the final vote would be five 
Justices in favor of not recognizing any constitutional right to an abortion (Bork, Scalia, 
Rehnquist, White, and Thomas) and four Justices favoring, in various forms, recognition of 
such a constitutional right (O’Connor, Souter, Stevens, and Blackmun). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Study Challenges Supreme Court’s Image as Defender of 
Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/us/study-
challenges-supreme-courts-image-as-defender-of-free-speech.html; Robert Corn-Revere & 
Ronald K.L. Collins, The Roberts Court and the Fight for First Amendment Freedoms, 
A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. FIRST AMEND. & MEDIA LITIG. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.
org/litigation/committees/firstamendment/news.html; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts 
Court and Freedom of Speech, 63 F. COMM. L.J. 579 (2011). 
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his nomination.142 While Bork’s views about the First Amendment’s 
protection of free speech are not as well defined as his stance on abortion, 
sufficient evidence exists to formulate an educated hypothesis about how 
Bork might have ruled on some of the most contentious cases in this area. 
Between 1987 and the present day, some of the most notable free 
speech cases143 decided by the Court include: 
 
• Texas v. Johnson, holding that burning the American flag is 
a form of expression protected by the First Amendment.144 
 
• United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, striking 
down as unconstitutional a law blocking channels 
dedicated to “sexually oriented content” during certain 
hours.145 
 
• Virginia v. Black, holding that a blanket ban on cross-
burning violates the First Amendment protections of free 
expression and that cross-burning could be criminalized 
only if the intent of the act was to inspire fear of imminent 
bodily harm.146 
 
• Garcetti v. Ceballos, determining that a government 
employee’s speech in the workplace and about workplace 
policies is not protected by the First Amendment.147 
 
• Morse v. Frederick, deciding that school officials did not 
violate the First Amendment by preventing a student from 
holding up a “pro-drug” banner at a school-sponsored 
event.148 
 
• Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, holding that the 
federal government can ban the distribution of any 
                                                 
 142. See, e.g., Public Citizen Litigation Group, supra note 5, at 338–45; Response to 
the Critics, supra note 5, at 409–29; Gillers, supra note 5, at 47–52. 
 143. Again, this does not claim to be a comprehensive review of all leading free speech 
cases of the past twenty-five years. As with the abortion cases, I tried to select decisions that 
were close cases (preferably 5–4 or 6–3 decisions) and decisions in which Justice Kennedy 
played a particularly important role (i.e., a key vote to tilt the Court in one direction or 
another). 
 144. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 145. 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
 146. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). The case placed the burden on the state to prove that burning 
the cross was more than just an expression of views, but was instead actually intended to 
inspire fear of bodily harm in a particular person or group. Id. 
 147. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 148. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
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“material support” to organizations deemed to be a threat to 
the United States without violating the First Amendment.149 
 
• Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
overturning a law restricting independent political 
campaign expenditures by corporations (and, by extension, 
unions).150 
 
• United States v. Alvarez, holding that a law criminalizing 
lying about receiving military honors violates the First 
Amendment protections of free speech.151 
1. Where Kennedy Stands 
Justice Kennedy is recognized as one of the most vigorous 
defenders of free speech rights on the Court today.152 However, in this 
limited sample of cases, it also becomes evident that Kennedy is not an 
absolutist with regard to freedom of speech. Instead, his “swing vote” 
legacy appears to be in full effect when it comes to free speech decisions. 
His record in these cases reveals a judge who recognizes the importance of 
this constitutional right but who is also willing to rule that it can be 
outweighed by other competing interests. 
One of Kennedy’s signature moments announcing his presence on 
the Court was his concurring opinion in Texas v. Johnson, authored just one 
year after his confirmation by the Senate.153 In holding that burning the flag 
as a protest was protected by the First Amendment, Kennedy delivered a 
short yet resounding—and seemingly expansive—defense of First 
Amendment protection of distasteful speech and expressive activities.154 In 
part, he noted: 
                                                 
 149. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 150. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 151. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 152. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts 
Court, The First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 438, 452 
(2013) (stating that Justice Kennedy is “likely to lean towards a kind of near-absolutism” in 
free speech cases and describing Kennedy as “a force in this area of law”); Ashutosh 
Avinash Bhagwat & Matthew Struhar, Justice Kennedy’s Free Speech Jurisprudence: A 
Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 167 (2013) (evaluating 
Kennedy’s decisions as generally expanding, rather than contracting, the First Amendment 
right to freedom of speech); Eugene Volokh, The Justices and Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 30, 2000, at A27, available at http://www2.law.ucla.edu/volokh/justices.htm (stating 
that “[t]he Justice who takes the broadest view of free speech rights is actually moderate 
conservative Justice Kennedy” and noting that at that point in his career, Kennedy voted for 
free speech claimants in 74% of cases that he had heard). 
 153. 491 U.S. 397, 420–21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 154. See id. 
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The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we 
do not like. We make them because they are right, right in 
the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, 
compel the result. And so great is our commitment to the 
process that, except in the rare case, we do not pause to 
express distaste for the result, perhaps for fear of 
undermining a valued principle that dictates the decision. 
This is one of those rare cases. Though symbols often are 
what we ourselves make of them, the flag is constant in 
expressing beliefs Americans share, beliefs in law and 
peace and that freedom which sustains the human spirit. 
The case here today forces recognition of the costs to 
which those beliefs commit us. It is poignant but 
fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in 
contempt.155 
Since Texas v. Johnson, Kennedy has frequently cast the deciding 
vote in tense cases where controversial speech and expression are at issue. 
In the Playboy Entertainment Group case, for instance, Kennedy wrote the 
majority opinion, striking down the law blocking channels dedicated to 
“sexually oriented” content.156 With Virginia v. Black, he joined Justice 
Souter’s concurring opinion arguing that the law against cross-burning 
should be overturned, but also that no vestige of the statute—including the 
provision allowing criminalization of cross-burning with the intent to 
intimidate—should be preserved.157 Much more recently, in Citizens 
United, Kennedy wrote the Court’s opinion in the 5–4 decision that 
extended free speech rights to corporations and unions, and held that 
monetary campaign contributions by these entities qualified as protected 
speech under the First Amendment.158 And in 2012, Kennedy wrote the 
controlling plurality opinion in United States v. Alvarez, applying First 
Amendment protections to the right to lie and profit from those lies.159 
However, Kennedy has also voted against free speech interests in a 
number of landmark cases, including scenarios where he found content-
based restrictions on speech and expression to be perfectly valid. For 
example, Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
finding that the free speech rights of a government employee were 
diminished when speaking as an employee and talking about the policies of 
                                                 
 155. Id. 
 156. 529 U.S. 803, 806–27 (2000). 
 157. 538 U.S. 343, 380–87 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring). The keystone of this 
concurring opinion, which was also joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, is that the 
content-based nature of this statute invalidated it, even in circumstances where the 
defendants might have intended to intimidate a particular person or group by the act of 
cross-burning. See id. 
 158. 558 U.S. 310, 318–72 (2010). 
 159. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
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his workplace.160 The employee’s First Amendment interests, Kennedy 
wrote, were outweighed by the public interest of a well-functioning 
government, which demanded cooperation in government workplaces.161 In 
the Court’s 5–4 Morse v. Frederick decision, he joined a concurring 
opinion by Justice Samuel Alito, agreeing with the decision to uphold a 
school’s right to punish “pro-drug” speech but limiting the holding to 
restrictions on speech “that a reasonable observer would interpret as 
advocating illegal drug use.”162 Under this opinion, therefore, Morse could 
not be used to stand for any other forms of restrictions on schoolhouse 
speech.163 In the view of Alito and Kennedy, it particularly provided “no 
support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on any political or social issue.”164 
Perhaps most surprisingly of all, Kennedy joined the Court’s 
majority in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, upholding the 
government’s right to restrict any form of “material support” to a group 
deemed to be a national security threat.165 Even though the “material 
support” in question was clearly non-violent in nature and was actually 
aimed at encouraging organizations not to engage in terrorist activities, 
Kennedy—and the majority of Court—determined that the potential 
security risk outweighed the rights of free speech and free association under 
these circumstances.166 
In a way, these three cases in which Kennedy ruled against free 
speech protections—Garcetti, Morse, and Holder—might be the most 
revealing set of information regarding the hard-to-pinpoint First 
Amendment views of Justice Kennedy: a defender of First Amendment 
freedoms in many instances, but willing to yield those freedoms to 
competing government interests such as national security, workplace 
morale, and the “war on drugs.” At the very least, it provides a useful 
starting point for comparing Kennedy’s free speech views with those of 
Robert Bork. 
                                                 
 160. 547 U.S. 410, 413–26 (2006). 
 161. See id. 
 162. 551 U.S. 393, 422–25 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 163. See id. at 422. 
 164. Id. at 422, 425.This rationale seemed consistent with Kennedy’s earlier decision in 
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, where Kennedy, writing for the 5–4 majority, held 
that the University had improperly denied funding to a campus group wanting to publish a 
Christian magazine, as withholding such funding stifled the spread of various social and 
religious viewpoints on campus. See 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Whether Kennedy was also 
influenced, if not persuaded, to rule this way because of his own strong religious convictions 
is a subject for another article. 
 165. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712–31 (2010). 
 166. See id. 
2014] WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN 245 
2. Where Bork Stood 
Robert Bork first came to the always-lively free speech debates 
with a bang in 1971. That was the year when the Indiana Law Journal 
published Bork’s article Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems,167 a provocative piece containing statements that later followed 
him to his Senate confirmation hearing battles.168 Overall, Bork’s article 
expressed the view that the First Amendment should protect solely 
“political speech,”169 which he went on to define as “speech concerned with 
government behavior, policy or personnel.”170 
Such a constrained perspective of the First Amendment’s scope 
succeeded in shocking plenty of readers.171 Under the viewpoint that Bork 
advocated in this article, the First Amendment would offer no protection to 
works of literature and art, scientific theories, commercial advertisements, 
or educational debates about non-political themes.172 Only speech 
pertaining to the government—but not advocating any sort of overthrow of 
the government173—could receive First Amendment protection from 
criminalization.174 “The line drawn must, therefore, lie between the 
explicitly political and all else,” Bork wrote. “Not too much should be made 
of the undeniable fact that there will be hard cases. Any theory of the First 
Amendment that does not accord absolute protection for all verbal 
expression . . . will require that a spectrum be cut and the location of the cut 
will always be, arguably, arbitrary.”175 
In later years, however, Bork pulled back from the hard-and-fast 
stance that he promoted in this article. For instance, in a 1984 letter to the 
American Bar Association, he portrayed a more “open” Speech Clause than 
                                                 
 167. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1 (1971) [hereinafter Neutral Principles]. 
 168. See Michael W. McConnell, The First Amendment Jurisprudence of Judge Robert 
Bork, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 63 (1987) (defending Bork’s free speech decisions and writings); 
Anthony Lewis, Bork on Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/
1987/09/03/opinion/abroad-at-home-bork-on-free-speech.html (calling Bork a “committed 
radical” regarding his views on the Speech Clause); Doug Cassel, The Law: People v. Robert 
Bork, CHI. READER (Aug. 13, 1987), http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/the-law-people-
v-robert-bork/Content?oid=870977; Public Citizen Litigation Group, supra note 5, at 338–
45; Response to the Critics, supra note 5, at 409–29; Gillers, supra note 5, at 47–52. 
 169. Neutral Principles, supra note 167, at 26. 
 170. Id. at 27. 
 171. See, e.g., supra note 168. 
 172. Neutral Principles, supra note 167, at 28 (“It does not cover scientific, 
educational, commercial, or literary expressions as such.”); see also id. at 27 (“I agree that 
there is an analogy between criticism of official behavior and the publication of a novel like 
Ulysses, for the latter may form attitudes that ultimately affect politics. But it is an analogy, 
not an identity.”). 
 173. See id. at 31 (“Speech advocating violent overthrow is thus not ‘political speech’ 
as that term must be defined by a Madisonian system of government.”). 
 174. See id. at 26–27. 
 175. Id. at 28. 
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what he had originally described.176 “I have long since concluded that many 
other forms of discourse, such as moral and scientific debate, are central to 
democratic government and deserve protection,” he wrote, “and continue to 
think that obscenity and pornography do not fit this rationale.”177 Later, at 
the Senate confirmation hearings, he defended this viewpoint in a dialogue 
with Senator Joseph Biden.178 “Protection is going to spread out from 
[political speech] . . . into moral speech and the scientific speech into 
fiction, and so forth,” Bork stated. “That statement explicitly contemplates 
protection for fiction and so forth, whatever that is.”179 Then, later, he 
continued: “I think when you get to speech or print, which is purely for 
sexual gratification, pornography, or obscenity, I fail to see its connection 
to anything.”180 
From this, one can glean a few absolutes about Bork’s thoughts on 
freedom of speech. Clearly, vulgarity and sexually oriented speech received 
no protection. And even under the more inclusive viewpoint that he 
expressed in 1984, it seems evident that Bork’s interpretation of freedom of 
speech provided significantly more limits than the Supreme Court’s modern 
jurisprudence in this area. For instance, the Court recently held that selling 
violent video games to minors was protected under the Speech Clause,181 as 
was engaging in vulgar protests at military funerals182 and selling videos 
depicting acts of extreme animal cruelty.183 In each case, the Court 
decisively ruled that the act in question constituted protected “speech.”184 
Yet each of these decisions would be anathema to Bork’s views of freedom 
of speech. He would almost certainly have held that each of these forms of 
expression were unprotected, as they involved obscene acts that were not 
tied to the process of democratic governance.185 
Bork also held a somewhat limited view toward freedom of the 
press, stating that the media should not receive any form of heightened 
                                                 
 176. See The Bork Hearings: Judge Bork at Senate Hearing: In Defense of Past 
Statements and Opinions, N.Y TIMES (Sept. 18, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/18/
us/bork-hearings-judge-bork-senate-hearing-defense-past-statements-opinions.html. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 182. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 183. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 184. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2742; Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220–21; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 
460. 
 185. Bork specifically stated that the First Amendment should allow censorship to 
promote a more moral culture. SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH, supra note 62, at 140. 
“Sooner or later censorship is going to have to be considered, as popular culture keeps 
plunging to ever more sickening lows.” Id. “The alternative to censorship, legal and moral, 
will be a brutalized and chaotic culture, with all that entails for our society, economy, 
politics, and physical safety.” Id. He concluded the book by stating that the lone hope for 
American values is “perhaps in administering censorship to the vilest aspects of our popular 
culture.” Id. at 342. 
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protection of expression,186 although he was often sympathetic toward 
newspapers in libel suits.187 And he noted his strong dislike for virtually any 
form of free speech and expression among students in schools. “Once more 
the lunacies of America’s rights-crazed culture are on display in our highest 
court—disguised, of course, as a serious civil-liberties issue,” he wrote after 
the Court agreed to hear arguments in Morse v. Frederick.188 He went on to 
argue that schools need the authority to suspend unruly students for 
inappropriate speech without judicial intervention.189 “It is unfortunate in 
the extreme that the law is being forced into every institution and social 
relationship,” he stated. “When the law attacks authorities within 
institutions, it weakens those institutions, deprives them of their integrity, 
and makes them less effective.”190 
Still, it appears that the basis of Bork’s views on the Speech Clause 
stemmed primarily from political speech. Speech about moral and scientific 
matters was protected only because of their relation to democratic 
governance. Speech by schoolchildren was not protected if it was about 
drugs instead of about the democratic process.191 His free speech 
jurisprudence from the D.C. Circuit bears witness to this. In Ollman v. 
Evans, for example, Bork’s concurring opinion held that a newspaper 
column criticizing a university professor was protected because the plaintiff 
“placed himself in the political arena and became the subject of heated 
political debate.”192 In Reuber v. United States, he emphatically made the 
point that a government physician would have no First Amendment case if 
his speech was solely about “his employer’s business judgment and 
integrity” but would have a viable claim if the speech in question criticized 
government policies.193 Writing for the court in Lebron v. Washington 
                                                 
 186. Robert H. Bork, The First Amendment Does Not Give Greater Freedom to the 
Press Than to Speech, CENTER MAG., Mar.–Apr. 1979, at 28–34. 
 187. See Public Citizen Litigation Group, supra note 5, at 343–44. Whether these 
decisions are truly stimulated by Bork’s belief in the First Amendment rights of newspapers 
or by Bork’s concern for protecting the business interests of newspapers from financial harm 
is a matter of debate and speculation. Id. 
 188. Robert H. Bork, Thanks a Lot, NAT’L REVIEW, Apr. 16, 2007, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20130410132839/http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
publication_details&id=5088 [hereinafter Thanks a Lot]. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. However, even this is called into doubt when it comes to the schools. In 2007, 
Bork wrote in praise of Justice Hugo Black for dissenting in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, the 1969 case where the Court held that students 
had a First Amendment right to wear black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam 
War. Thanks a Lot, supra note 188. Bork argued that Black was correct when he dissented 
and wrote that “the Court had taken from educational officials ‘the power to control pupils’” 
by allowing the conduct at issue in that case. Id. Teachers and students, Bork indicated, 
automatically have a lessened free speech expectation once they enter the schoolhouse, even 
when the speech in question is political. See id. 
 192. 750 F.2d 970, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 193. Reuber v. U.S., 750 F.2d 1039, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). 
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Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, he determined that the city subway 
system’s refusal to lease space to a man wanting to display a “deceptive” 
anti-Reagan poster was an unconstitutional prior restraint.194 The reason: 
“[C]ourts ought not to restrain speech where the message sought to be 
communicated is political and is sufficiently ambiguous to allow a 
discerning viewer [or reader] to recognize it as something other than a 
reproduction of an actual event.”195 According to a study by Public Citizens 
Advocacy Group, most of Bork’s decisions in free speech cases continue in 
this same vein.196 
Thus, it seems that Bork’s judgment in matters where freedom of 
speech is at issue centers primarily on whether that speech can be tied to the 
political process. While his views on the issue may be a bit more open than 
they were in 1971, his notion of the right to free speech is still quite limited. 
3. The Bork Effect 
Again, we proceed on the assumption that Bork would have 
required some tie to “political speech” in order to deem a particular form of 
speech protected by the First Amendment. From his writings, it is also clear 
that he would have been extremely hesitant to find such a link in situations 
involving obscenity, pornography, or in matters where institutional 
authority (particularly in schools) was placed at risk. 
Thus, Bork likely would have voted the same way that Kennedy did 
in Morse v. Frederick, arguing that the student’s speech about drugs was 
unprotected.197 Yet he would probably not have joined Alito’s concurrence 
protecting the right of students to engage in other forms of controversial 
speech while in school. Instead, he would have promoted the power of 
schools to greatly limit student speech without any potential First 
Amendment consequences. He also would have likely ruled the same way 
that Kennedy did in Garcetti v. Ceballos, finding that the employee’s 
speech was not protected. Indeed, this case has many crossovers with 
Reuber, in which Bork specifically stated that the government employee’s 
speech would not be protected if it criticized the judgment of his 
                                                 
 194. Lebron v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 195. Id. at 898 (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). But see 
Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that a law prohibiting 
protests within 500 feet of a Washington, D.C., embassy was constitutional, even though it 
prohibited protests of a political nature in this zone). Bork determined that on balance, a 
government interest of protecting diplomats entering and leaving these embassies from 
potential danger outweighed the value of the political speech from protestors in this 
situation. Id. at 1454. 
 196. Public Citizen Litigation Group, supra note 5, at 338–45; see also Gillers, supra 
note 5, at 47–52. But see U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 5, at 409–29; McConnell, supra 
note 168, at 63–74 (arguing that Bork’s free speech views are “moderate” and respect the 
limits originally intended by the Framers but are not unduly restrictive). 
 197. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422–25 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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supervisor.198 And he would have almost certainly ruled the same way 
Kennedy did in Holder, finding that the government could ban “material 
support” to certain groups in the name of national security.199 Given Bork’s 
desire for courts to stop “interfering” in matters of war and America’s 
safety, the government’s stated interests would outweigh any political 
speech value held in the materials shared with the organization in 
question.200 
However, Bork likely would have differed from Kennedy in Texas 
v. Johnson. While burning the flag could be seen as political speech, it 
seems that Bork would have been more likely to find it an act of wanton 
obscenity. Notably, he argued that speech advocating government 
overthrow was not political speech.201 Flag-burning—which Bork 
specifically deemed to be “not speech”202—would seem to fall into this 
category. Thus, with Bork on the Court instead of Kennedy, the case would 
have ended 5–4 in the opposite direction, holding that flag-burning was not 
an act protected by the First Amendment, and therefore was conduct that 
could be criminalized.203 
Bork would probably also have voted differently than Kennedy in 
the Playboy Entertainment Group case. Given his statements that speech 
for “sexual gratification” was not protected by the First Amendment and 
that censorship could be allowed for morally reprehensible speech in 
popular culture,204 Bork likely would have upheld the law banning 
“sexually oriented” programming during particular times of day. This, too, 
                                                 
 198. See Reuber, 750 F.2d at 1065 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 199. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712–31 (2010). 
 200. Comments about Bork’s opinions on the need for courts to step back when 
national security interests are at issue could fill an entire paper. For one characteristic 
example of how Bork views this issue, though, see Robert H. Bork & David B. Rivkin, Jr., A 
War the Courts Shouldn’t Manage, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2005, http://web.archive.org/web/
20130410132802/http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=
3595. In this article, Bork argues that the primary concern in deciding whom to nominate to 
the federal courts is “avoiding judicial mismanagement of America’s war against radical 
Islamic terrorists.” Id. “Already there are disturbing signs of judicial overreaching that is 
constitutionally illegitimate and, in practical terms, potentially debilitating,” he wrote. Id. He 
went on to argue that judges need to be more sensitive to unique wartime needs and 
freedoms, criticizing a Supreme Court decision that held that the right of habeas corpus 
applied to Guantanamo Bay detainees. Id. “Too much is riding on the outcome of this war—
ultimately, perhaps, the survival of Western societies—to choose judges who are unaware of 
what is at stake,” he concluded. Id. 
 201. Neutral Principles, supra note 167, at 31. 
 202. SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH, supra note 62, at 100. 
 203. The outcome would be five Justices against granting constitutional protection to 
flag burning (Bork, Stevens, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and White), and four Justices in favor of 
granting First Amendment protection to flag burning (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Scalia). 
 204. Supra notes 177 & 185. 
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would have changed the overall outcome of the case, allowing the statute to 
stand by a 5–4 margin.205 
Similarly, Bork probably would have voted the opposite way that 
Kennedy did in Alvarez. Most likely, Bork would have stated that there is 
no connection between lying about receiving military honors and the 
political process. Consequently, Bork would have held that the First 
Amendment does not shield this speech. The fact that the reputation of the 
military is at issue also could have enhanced Bork’s propensity of 
permitting criminalization of this type of lying, given Bork’s obvious 
concerns about the judiciary refraining from undermining the military’s 
mission.206 His vote in this case would not have changed the ultimate 
outcome, but would have turned the 6–3 decision into a much closer 5–4 
result.207 
The tougher calls for Bork would have occurred with Virginia v. 
Black and with Citizens United. Both are cases where he easily could have 
found the existence of political speech, the typical keystone of Bork’s free 
speech analysis. However, both involved conduct that strays from the 
commonly understood definitions of “speech”—burning crosses in Black 
and making corporate donations to political candidates in Citizens United. 
This could have given Bork an easy out if he wished to find that either of 
these forms of expression was not protected speech. For instance, he could 
have argued that cross-burning did not pass the test of being “explicitly 
political,” and could have even conceivably denounced it as a form of 
unprotected obscenity. 
Yet it seems more likely that Bork would have found a political 
link in both of these cases, and voted to strike down both the cross-burning 
statute in Black and the campaign finance law in Citizens United. 
Undoubtedly, Citizens United would have been the easier of the two for 
Bork, who could have found that since the money was used to further 
political campaigns, it was directly tied to the democratic process, and thus 
received First Amendment protection. This would lead Bork to vote the 
same way that Kennedy voted, leaving the outcome of this case 
unchanged.208 Virginia v. Black would have been a harder sell, but Bork 
                                                 
 205. With Bork instead of Kennedy on the Court, the outcome would likely be as 
follows: Five Justices upholding the statute forbidding channels dedicated to “sexually 
oriented programming” to broadcast during certain times of the day (Bork, Scalia, Breyer, 
Rehnquist, and O’Connor), and four Justices voting to strike down the statute as a violation 
of the First Amendment’s Speech Clause (Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg). 
 206. See Bork & Rivkin, supra note 200. 
 207. Voting that lying about receiving military honors was speech protected by the First 
Amendment would be Roberts, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan. Voting to uphold 
the Defense of Valor Act, which made such speech a criminal offense, would be Bork, Alito, 
Scalia, and Thomas. 
 208. Bork would simply replace Kennedy in the majority holding that the McCain-
Feingold Act limitation on independent corporate expenditures violated the First 
Amendment. 
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could have found that burning crosses was a way for citizens to express 
their feelings about certain types of laws (i.e., civil rights laws) to the 
government and make a “political process” link in that manner. He then 
could have voted, as Kennedy did, to overturn the cross-burning ban as an 
unconstitutional infringement on free speech. 
C. The Right to Bear Arms 
Until relatively recently, the Supreme Court stayed away from the 
Second Amendment.209 Although gun ownership issues are commonly in 
the forefront of public debate, decades passed without the Court handing 
down any sort of decision interpreting the constitutional extent of the 
people’s “right to bear arms.”210 Then, in 2008, the Court finally spoke on 
the limits of the Second Amendment in the case of District of Columbia v. 
Heller.211 In a 5–4 decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court ruled that 
the Second Amendment recognized an individual’s right to keep and bear 
arms even when their ownership of guns had no relation to serving in a 
militia.212 Furthermore, the Court held that inherent in this individual right 
was the ability to use firearms for “traditionally lawful purposes,” such as 
defending one’s home and family.213 
Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held 
that the constitutional right of individuals to own firearms and use them for 
“traditionally lawful purposes” applied to the states.214 Any state law that 
infringed upon this right would be a violation of due process of law.215 Put 
another way, the Court deemed that the Second Amendment was 
“incorporated” to all of the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.216 
These cases are the only two major Second Amendment decisions 
by the Court in the last twenty-five years. Together, though, they 
established a principle that formally expanded the scope of the Second 
Amendment, thereby increasing the protections for gun owners against both 
the federal government and the governments of the states. 
                                                 
 209. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 
639–42 (1989) (discussing the surprising scarcity of major cases, law review articles, or 
discussions of any substantive sort about the Second Amendment). 
 210. See id.; see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second 
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995) (noting that the Second Amendment was “almost 
completely ignored” for two centuries). 
 211. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 212. Id. at 636. 
 213. Id. at 577; see also id. at 636 (stating that the Second Amendment will not permit 
an “absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home”). 
 214. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
 215. Id. 
 216. See id. 
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1. Where Kennedy Stands 
Justice Kennedy has not proven to be particularly outspoken on 
Second Amendment issues. Yet within the two Second Amendment cases 
that have come before him during his time on the Court, Kennedy has also 
clearly shown where he stands on this debate. In Heller, he joined the 
majority opinion written by Scalia, finding that the Second Amendment 
included an individual right to own firearms and to use them for 
traditionally lawful purposes.217 And in McDonald, he joined the 
controlling plurality opinion written by Alito, applying the Second 
Amendment right of individuals to bear and use firearms to all of the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.218 
Both of these cases were 5–4 decisions. Thus, Kennedy’s vote was 
regarded as the tiebreaker between four Justices who seemed guaranteed to 
vote for a more expansive view of the Second Amendment and four Justices 
who seemed guaranteed to vote for a more restrictive view of the right to 
bear arms.219 Therefore, with a different justice on the Court, the outcome 
of these controversial cases could have been very different. 
2. Where Bork Stood 
Bork’s position on the Second Amendment was never outwardly 
apparent. During his tenure on the D.C. Circuit, he never decided a case 
that hinged on a Second Amendment issue. However, he did speak and 
write about gun control on a number of occasions, although his viewpoints 
in these remarks and articles were not always consistent. From these 
examples, though, one can gain some understanding of how Bork might 
have voted in a Second Amendment case if he were on the Supreme Court. 
In a 1989 interview, Bork specifically stated that the Second 
Amendment guarantees “the right of states to form militias, not for 
individuals to bear arms.”220 He repeated this view two years later in a 
                                                 
 217. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
 218. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3020–50. 
 219. Of course, the Justices could have certainly broken from their standard ideological 
lines in their voting. Yet given the strong ideological lines on which the Roberts Court is 
drawn, it would be extremely unlikely that Alito, Scalia, Thomas, or Roberts would have 
voted against an individual right to bear and use firearms. It would have been just as unlikely 
for Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, or Souter (or Sotomayor, who had replaced Souter on the 
Court by the time McDonald was decided) to vote in favor of interpreting the Second 
Amendment to allow an individual right to bear and use arms. For an excellent look at the 
partisan nature of judging on the Supreme Court today, see Vincent M. Bonventre, A Court 
of Shameless Partisans. (Supreme Court: How Partisan? Ideological? Activist?—with 
Graphs!), N.Y. CT. WATCHER (June 24, 2012), http://www.newyorkcourtwatcher.com/2012/
06/part-11-court-of-shameless-partisans.html. 
 220. Claudia Luther, Lectures at UCI with Rose Bird: Bork Says State Gun Laws 
Constitutional, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1989, at B5, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
1989-03-15/local/me-587_1_state-gun-laws-constitutional. 
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point-counterpoint with Laurence Tribe.221 This directly contradicts the 
holding in Heller and, by extension, McDonald. Bork was roundly 
criticized by the pro-gun lobby for taking this position,222 but never 
appeared to retract it. 
Later, though, in his book Slouching Toward Gomorrah, Bork 
proclaimed that “gun control shifts the equation in favor of the criminal.”223 
He went on to criticize gun control laws as examples of activist judges 
being too soft on lawbreakers, opening windows for offenders to commit 
more frequent and more dangerous crimes.224 With this point of view, it 
would seem that Bork may have shifted his opinions in favor of an 
individual right to bear firearms and use them for traditionally lawful 
purposes, as this could give law-abiding citizens a means of defense against 
delinquents trying to harm them. 
Perhaps the most revealing piece of Bork’s later-in-life Second 
Amendment views, however, is the fact that he joined an amicus curiae 
brief in Heller urging the Court to find a broad constitutionally protected 
individual right to own and use firearms.225 Interestingly, the brief also 
urged the Court to limit its conception of this individual right to the types of 
weapons reasonably foreseen by the drafters of the Bill of Rights, such as 
common handguns.226 Therefore, the individual right to own and use 
firearms would not, under this view, be extended to more modern devices 
such as automatic and semi-automatic weapons.227 
The question, then, is which Bork existed by the time the Court 
decided its two major Second Amendment cases: the Bork who saw no 
individual right in the Second Amendment or the Bork who signed onto a 
brief advocating for the Court to find precisely that right in Heller? The 
best clue appears to be the fact that both the Heller brief and the negative 
remarks about gun control in Slouching Toward Gomorrah were much 
                                                 
 221. Miriam Bensimhorn, Advocates: Point and Counterpoint, Laurence Tribe and 
Robert Bork Debate the Framers’ Spacious Terms, LIFE, Fall 1991 (Special Issue), at 96, 98 
(“[T]he National Rifle Association is always arguing that the Second Amendment 
determines the right to bear arms. But I think it really is people’s right to bear arms in a 
militia.”). 
 222. Indeed, the conservative National Rifle Association refused to lobby for Bork after 
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 223. SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH, supra note 62, at 167. 
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Respondent, D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 405551. 
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apparent that machineguns do not.”). 
 227. Id. 
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more recent statements than the interview. Thus, it seems probable that 
Bork’s thoughts about the Second Amendment shifted since 1989, leading 
him to ultimately recognize an individual right to keep and use firearms 
even without any militia connection. 
Still, the analysis does not end here. Even if Bork recognized an 
individual constitutional right to bear arms, this does not inherently mean 
that he would have supported this law’s application to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Plenty of judges have recognized individual rights 
but balked at a blanket application of those rights to the states. And on 
several occasions, beginning with his criticisms of Roe v. Wade228 and of 
various civil rights cases,229 Bork advised the Supreme Court to leave state 
laws alone unless a breach of the Constitution is obvious.230 
However, in his hearings before the Senate, Bork declared his “full 
acceptance of the incorporation doctrine”231—the notion that the entire Bill 
of Rights should be applied to the states through “incorporation” into the 
Fourteenth Amendment.232 This is a position that has never gained a 
majority of votes on the Court, although many decisions have allowed the 
“incorporation” of certain rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.233 But if 
Bork truly had adopted this viewpoint and had been confirmed as a 
Supreme Court justice, then perhaps Bork’s opinions may have turned out 
differently than one might be outwardly inclined to suspect.234 
                                                 
 228. See supra notes 118 & 121. 
 229. See infra notes 290–301. 
 230. See also Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, FIRST THINGS, November 1996, 
at 21–24 (“[W]hen the Court invented the theory that the Bill of Rights limited states as well 
as the federal government . . . the opportunities for judicial government exploded . . . . The 
list of such incursions into the legitimate sphere of democratic control goes on and on.”). 
 231. The Bork Hearings; Final Remarks: Interpret Law, Not Make It, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
20, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/20/us/the-bork-hearings-final-remarks-
interpret-law-not-make-it.html. 
 232. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill 
of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1950); see also Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on 
“Incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965). 
 233. For a concise but illuminating discussion of the “incorporation” debate at the U.S. 
Supreme Court, see Richard C. Cortner, The Nationalization of the Bill of Rights: An 
Overview, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N, & AM. HIST. ASS’N (Fall 1985), http://www.apsanet.org/
imgtest/Nationalization_Bill.pdf. Importantly, while a majority of the Court has never 
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notably Justice Hugo Black. See id. 
 234. But see Our Judicial Oligarchy, supra note 230, at 21–24. Here, Bork presented a 
viewpoint that definitely does not appear friendly to the “incorporation” doctrine. Thus, it 
remains unclear whether Bork really would have followed this professed acceptance of 
“incorporation” if he were on the Court, particularly since the article cited here is a much 
more recent statement than his Senate confirmation hearing testimony. 
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3. The Bork Effect 
It is difficult to discern how Bork would have affected the outcome 
in these two Second Amendment cases if he were on the Court instead of 
Kennedy. With Heller, however, all recent signs indicate that he would 
have joined Scalia’s majority opinion, just as Kennedy did. While Bork’s 
comments from 1989 give cause to wonder whether he might have ruled 
otherwise, his more recent remarks criticizing gun control laws tilt the 
scales in the opposite direction, and the fact that he joined an amicus brief 
supporting the ultimate outcome in Heller seals the deal. The decision 
under Bork thus would have been the same as it was under Kennedy, with a 
5–4 majority upholding an individual right to bear arms and use them for 
traditional lawful purposes. 
Bork’s likely holding in McDonald is an even closer call. If he 
continued to espouse the doctrine of total incorporation, then he certainly 
would have voted to extend the Second Amendment to all of the states.235 
This would be the same holding that Kennedy reached in McDonald. Yet 
Bork’s writings about the importance of respecting states’ rights create 
doubt about whether Bork would have willingly interceded in so many 
areas. In the end, the decision probably would have come down to whether 
Bork, the judge praised by Reagan for his “judicial restraint,” would have 
been willing to impose a previously unforeseen individual right on the 
states. 
D. Civil Rights 
After abortion, the issues that sparked the greatest amount of 
denigration when Bork was nominated for the Supreme Court dealt with 
civil rights. In particular, Bork’s interpretations of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment came under heavy fire.236 Senator 
Kennedy was far from the only acerbic critic of Bork’s record on these 
matters.237 In the end, it appeared that a fear that Bork would not protect the 
                                                 
 235. Again, though, Bork’s ultimate position on this issue was hardly clear. See supra 
note 234. 
 236. See, e.g., Editorial, Against Robert Bork; His Bill of Rights Is Different, N.Y. 
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rights of women and minorities238 was a leading cause of the Senate’s 
resounding rejection.239 
“Civil rights” is an immense category, and judicial records in such 
cases truly deserve an article of their own. Yet by looking at some of the 
hallmark cases from the past twenty-five years, we can at least gain a sense 
of how Bork might have changed the Court’s direction on some of these 
issues. For this section, we will look at the following “highlight” cases: 
 
• Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, holding that a 
workplace policy barring potentially fertile and pregnant 
women from occupations that could be detrimental to their 
reproductive capacities was a form of gender 
discrimination that violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964.240 
 
• Romer v. Evans, recognizing that homosexuals could be 
considered to be a constitutionally protected class and 
overturning a Colorado law excluding homosexuals from 
enjoying safeguards against discrimination.241 
 
• Bragdon v. Abbott, deciding that a dentist who refused to 
fill a patient’s cavity in his office because she was HIV-
positive violated the Americans with Disabilities Act.242 
 
• Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, determining that the Boy 
Scouts of America could exclude homosexuals from their 
membership under an implicit freedom of “expressive 
association.”243 
 
• Grutter v. Bollinger, holding that a school’s “narrowly 
tailored” use of race as an admission criterion is 
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
                                                                                                                 
was proposed by certain groups, and asserting that his positions on civil rights issues are 
more in the “mainstream” than most commentators have realized). 
 238. Not only racial minorities, but also minorities in terms of religious affiliation, 
sexual orientation, etc. 
 239. See, e.g., JOHN W. DEAN, BROKEN GOVERNMENT: HOW REPUBLICAN RULE 
DESTROYED THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES (2007) (“[Bork’s] 
positions on civil rights were an anathema to all who cared about equality in America.”); 
Battle to Replace Justice Sandra Day O’Connor Begins (CNN television broadcast July 1, 
2005), transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0507/01/pzn.01.
html (noting that 180 civil rights and civil liberties groups opposed Bork’s nomination to the 
Court); Chemerinsky, supra note 237, at 1990. 
 240. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
 241. 517 U.S. 620, 620–21 (1996). 
 242. 524 U.S. 624, 624–25 (1998). 
 243. 530 U.S. 640, 641 (2000). 
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Fourteenth Amendment, as it furthers the compelling 
interest of achieving a diverse student body.244 
 
• Lawrence v. Texas, striking down a Texas statute outlawing 
homosexual sodomy as violating the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.245 
 
• Ricci v. DeStefano, determining that the City of New 
Haven violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discarding 
exams for firefighter promotions solely on the grounds that 
the test results showed a disproportionate number of white 
candidates gaining promotion over minority candidates.246 
1. Where Kennedy Stands 
In the cases reviewed here, Justice Kennedy again reveals his 
“swing vote” propensities with a mixed record on these civil rights issues. 
As with his First Amendment freedom of speech jurisprudence,247 he 
displays a strong interest toward protections of minority groups, but also 
shows a willingness to allow these civil rights concerns to be overcome on 
balance by other sufficiently competing interests. 
Kennedy’s “pro-civil rights” stances seem particularly strong when 
it comes to the civil rights of homosexuals. He wrote the majority opinion 
in both Romer v. Evans248 and Lawrence v. Texas,249 standing up against 
staunch opposition from the conservative wing of the Court in both cases.250 
In Lawrence, he displayed particular vigor in criticizing the Texas anti-
sodomy statute and its infringements upon personal liberties. At the time, 
the controlling precedent refused to recognize a right to homosexual 
conduct, even in the privacy of the home, because such a thing clearly 
would not have been considered by the drafters of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.251 In opposition to this rationale, Kennedy wrote: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment 
known the components of liberty in its manifold 
                                                 
 244. 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003). 
 245. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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fire department exhibited no intent to discriminate against minority candidates, and on the 
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 247. See supra notes 152–66. 
 248. 517 U.S. 620, 623–36 (1996). 
 249. 539 U.S. at 562–79. 
 250. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636–53 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
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possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did 
not presume to have this insight. They knew times can 
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that 
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only 
to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every 
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for 
greater freedom.252 
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, however, Kennedy did not vote 
in favor of the homosexual scoutmaster who had been expelled from the 
organization on account of his sexual orientation. Instead, he joined 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion, finding that a private organization has the 
right to exclude individuals for virtually any reason under an implicit First 
Amendment right of “expressive association.”253 Under the opinion, 
revoking the scoutmaster’s membership did not violate his Due Process or 
Equal Protection rights, as the group’s expressive association rights 
trumped these interests.254 Forcing the Boy Scouts to accept a leader whose 
values ran contrary to the established morals of the organization violated 
these expressive association rights, as it would prevent the group from 
adhering to and advocating a particular viewpoint.255 
With Bragdon v. Abbott, one of the leading Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) cases of the last twenty-five years, Kennedy 
authored the majority opinion of the 5–4 Court.256 In it, he wrote that the 
dentist’s office qualified as a “public accommodation”257 and that HIV 
qualified as a “disability,” even in cases where the disease was 
asymptomatic.258 Since the patient at issue likely did not pose a “direct 
threat to the health and safety of others,”259 Kennedy wrote that the doctor 
therefore violated the ADA by refusing to treat her in his office.260 
The Automobile Workers case resulted in a unanimous decision 
from the Court, with all nine Justices agreeing that the “fetal-protection 
policy” implemented by the company illegally discriminated against 
women.261 However, Kennedy joined a concurring opinion authored by 
Justice Byron White that revealed a more limited view of the decision than 
several of his brethren had taken. In his concurrence, White wrote that the 
Court erred in holding that a “sex-specific fetal-protection policy” could 
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never be justified under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.262 Instead, he stated 
that there could be circumstances that would qualify such a regulation 
under the “bona fide occupational qualification exception” of the Civil 
Rights Act.263 Safety exceptions were not abandoned by Congress in 
passing the Civil Rights Act, White stated, and therefore gender-specific 
bans on certain types of work because the health of a fetus was potentially 
at issue could overcome any alleged gender bias in such a policy.264 This 
would be particularly true in situations involving a woman who was 
pregnant.265 Kennedy’s decision to join this concurrence seems to speak 
volumes about his views in this area, illustrating his willingness to uphold 
laws that disadvantaged a particular gender if there was a sufficiently 
compelling health-and-safety justification. 
Kennedy dissented in Grutter, the affirmative action case dealing 
with race-based admission criteria.266 He partially joined a dissent written 
by Rehnquist,267 but also wrote his own separate dissent against the Court’s 
decision in this case.268 Primarily, Kennedy objected to what he considered 
to be an abandonment of the “strict scrutiny” standard of review for race-
based admission policies.269 While clearly stating that he supported the use 
of race as an admission criterion in certain limited circumstances,270 
Kennedy argued that the Court had applied only a “perfunctory” review in 
this case, thus allowing racial minorities to have preferential treatment in a 
situation where such preferences were not necessary.271 
Lastly, in the matter of Ricci v. DeStefano, Kennedy wrote the 
majority opinion for the 5–4 Court, holding that the City of New Haven had 
violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964.272 Overall, his opinion focused on the 
city’s lack of a “strong basis in evidence” that the promotional exam 
discriminated against minorities.273 Given that the exams were “job related” 
and consistent with the needs of the fire department in finding the best 
candidates for promotion, the allegations of discrimination were not strong 
enough for the city to cancel the results.274 Furthermore, Kennedy wrote, no 
“less discriminatory alternative” to the test was available, again showing 
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that the city did not have cause to void the results simply because whites 
tended to perform better than non-whites on the exam.275 
2. Where Bork Stood 
Unlike several other conservative judges, Bork publically stated 
that Brown v. Board of Education was correctly decided.276 While other 
judges labeled Brown Exhibit A for “judicial activism” and overreaching by 
the Supreme Court, Bork ultimately praised Brown as being a “splendid 
vindication[] of human freedom.”277 In another pro-Brown statement, he 
proclaimed that “as a matter of fact separate is never going to be equal in 
the area of race.”278 Bork also spoke out in favor of Loving v. Virginia,279 in 
which the Court overturned a statute forbidding interracial marriage,280 and 
NAACP v. Alabama, where the Court determined that the state could not 
force the NAACP to disclose its membership lists because it could hamper 
the group’s ability to engage in political advocacy.281 Such statements 
indicate that Bork could have been a pro-civil rights judge who truly 
believed that racial classifications are, in his own words, “invidious.”282 
However, other evidence points to Bork being much less 
sympathetic toward civil rights causes. Situations where civil rights 
interests interfered with business decisions received particular ire from 
him.283 He spoke out against legislation forbidding racial discrimination by 
owners of public accommodations, primarily on the grounds that forcing 
establishments to accept people of all races would injure the “personal 
liberty” of business owners.284 Bork saw no need for courts to impose their 
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view on the “preferences” of businesses in excluding certain racial 
groups—or any other class of people—from their midst.285 
Bork also developed a particularly narrow view of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Not long before his death, he said that the Clause should 
not apply to women at all.286 “They aren’t discriminated against anymore,” 
he stated in a 2012 interview.287 For decades, he argued that the Equal 
Protection Clause is far too expansive for the nation’s own good.288 To 
Bork, the open-ended language of the Clause became a blank check for 
improper judicial lawmaking, with judges affording special protection to 
certain groups “justified only by the sentimentalities or the morals of the 
class to which these judges and their defenders belong.”289 Until his last 
day, he advocated for a much more restrictive use of this constitutional 
provision. “The poor and the minorities have had access to the political 
process and have done very well through it,” he wrote in one particularly 
outspoken article, noting that they were granted protection through “civil 
rights laws of all kinds.”290 
Often, Bork argued that the government, including the judicial 
branch, tries to enforce a sense of morality in their laws and court decisions 
that favor minorities.291 His distaste for such “moral” interpretations of the 
Constitution were at the core of his criticisms of cases such as Oregon v. 
Mitchell, which allowed Congress to forbid states to use literacy tests as a 
requirement to vote,292 and Shelly v. Kraemer, which invalidated covenants 
that prevented members of a particular race from purchasing particular 
properties.293 And it formed the backbone of his statements against the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964: 
The principle of such legislation is that if I find your 
behavior ugly by my standards, moral or aesthetic, and if 
you prove stubborn about adopting my view of the 
situation, I am justified in having the state coerce you into 
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more righteous paths. That is itself a principle of 
unsurpassed ugliness.294 
Bork also opposed affirmative action policies in the workplace and 
in higher education. “The merit of the individual and the efficiency with 
which society accomplishes its work will be ideals submerged in a new 
ethos of group entitlement,”295 Bork wrote in one of his critiques of Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke, the first case to comprehensively 
discuss the legal merits of affirmative action policies in universities. “It is a 
thoroughly bad idea, and one wishes it had not been encouraged by 
Bakke.”296 
In the last years of his life, though, perhaps no specific area of civil 
rights received greater condemnation from Bork than the so-called “gay 
rights” cases. “The Court’s ongoing campaign to normalize 
homosexuality—creating for homosexuals constitutional rights to special 
voting status and to engage in sodomy—leaves little doubt that the Court 
has set its course for a right to marry,” Bork wrote in 2004. “This is but one 
of a series of cultural debacles forced upon us by judges following no law 
but their own predilections. This one, however, will be nuclear.”297 He went 
on to state that any future case permitting same-sex couples to marry would 
“rival Roe v. Wade” in the realm of “judicial incontinence.”298 Such 
remarks were characteristic of Bork’s commentaries about the judiciary’s 
recognition of homosexuals as a potentially constitutionally protected 
class.299 
On the D.C. Circuit, Bork’s opinion in the case of Dronenburg v. 
Zech300 clearly articulated where Bork stood on the issue of “homosexual 
rights.” The case involved a sailor who had been discharged from the Navy 
solely on the basis of his homosexuality.301 Writing for the court, Bork 
opined that the Navy had breached none of the sailor’s constitutional rights 
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by discharging him because of his sexual orientation.302 “We conclude, 
therefore, that we can find no constitutional right to engage in homosexual 
conduct and that, as judges, we have no warrant to create one,” Bork 
wrote.303 Given that the Navy’s policy was rationally related to the 
permissible end of enforcing moral standards in their branch of the military, 
the discharge was perfectly acceptable.304 
During his six years on the D.C. Circuit, Bork decided a mixed bag 
of civil rights cases. A study of these decisions noted that Bork “voted for 
one or more civil rights claims in seven out of the nine decisions he has 
rendered involving substantive interpretations of civil rights law protecting 
minorities or women.”305 However, Dronenburg was conspicuously absent 
from this analysis. Also missing from this discussion of Bork’s voting 
record were telling cases such as Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers 
International Union v. American Cyanamid Co., where Bork held that a 
company could require women to be sterilized as a condition for working 
there, as the quantity of lead in the air could endanger the fetuses of 
pregnant women.306 Thus, it appears that Bork’s overall stance on civil 
rights issues was not as tilted toward individual protections as this 
particular study indicates. 
It would be unjust to denounce Bork as a total foe of civil rights 
interests. However, based on the discussion in this section, it is also clear 
that Bork took a very limited view of civil rights issues. The question 
remaining to be answered, though, is whether that viewpoint would have 
altered the stance taken by the Supreme Court on the civil rights cases 
discussed in this section. 
3. The Bork Effect 
This analysis begins with a look at the “gay rights” cases that Bork 
disparaged in his writings and speaking engagements. There is little doubt 
that Bork would have voted to uphold the Colorado statute in Romer v. 
Evans and to uphold the law against homosexual sodomy in Lawrence v. 
Texas—the exact opposite of how Kennedy voted in these cases.307 
Ultimately, both outcomes would have been unchanged if Bork were on the 
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Court instead of Kennedy, but both would be much closer decisions than 
they were with Kennedy on the Court.308 
On the other hand, Bork’s decision in Dronenburg strongly 
indicates that he would have voted to permit the Boy Scouts to expel the 
homosexual scoutmaster based on their organization’s moral principles.309 
This is the same way that Kennedy voted in the Boy Scouts of America 
case,310 leaving this decision unbothered by Bork’s presence. 
In Grutter v. Bollinger, Bork’s adamant dislike of affirmative 
action policies in general,311 and of the Bakke case in particular, would have 
led him to vote against using race-based criteria in university admissions. 
His overall vote would have been the same as Kennedy’s vote in this 
case,312 leaving the decision unchanged. However, it is unlikely that Bork 
would have included Kennedy’s qualification that race is a legitimate 
criterion in admissions under certain circumstances. Instead, a dissent 
written or joined by Bork probably would have specified that race had no 
place at all in the admissions decisions of universities. 
The Automobile Workers case centered on the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, a law against which Bork objected strenuously.313 It also concerned a 
situation in which the judiciary could impinge on a workplace policy, 
something of which Bork had traditionally been quite wary.314 Additionally, 
his decision in the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers case also shows that 
Bork was not shy about upholding strident workplace regulations for the 
purpose of protecting the health of a woman’s fetus.315 Thus, there is a good 
chance that Bork would have become the lone dissenter in this case, 
holding that the company’s “fetal-protection plan” did not violate the Civil 
Rights Act and should be allowed to continue unimpeded by the courts. 
While it would not change the decisive outcome of the case, Bork’s dissent 
would have undoubtedly shown that there were fault lines on the Court 
regarding the legitimacy of the Civil Rights Act. 
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With Ricci v. DeStefano, Bork again would have been confronted 
by the workings of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This time, though, he 
would have had the opportunity to use the Civil Rights Act against a city 
employing tactics that Bork probably would have deemed to be a form of 
“reverse discrimination.” Most likely, he would have found—as Kennedy 
did—that there was no “strong basis in evidence” for throwing out the test 
results and that the city had discriminated against the non-minority 
firefighters as a result.316 The decision would have therefore remained 
unchanged if Bork were on the Court rather than Kennedy. 
Finally, there is the case of Bragdon v. Abbott, the matter involving 
the dentist who refused to fill the cavity of an HIV-positive patient.317 
Bork’s views regarding the ADA, the centerpiece of this decision, were 
unclear. However, Bork’s history shows that when the interests of a 
commercial enterprise are at issue, the business concerns tended to win out 
over individual civil rights concerns.318 On balance, therefore, it seems 
likely that Bork would have ruled in favor of the dentist rather than the 
HIV-positive plaintiff. The potential health risk of HIV transmission to 
dentists identified by Rehnquist in his dissent319 probably would have given 
Bork the opening that he needed to justify a ruling in the dentist’s favor. 
This would have caused a total upheaval of the decision. Without 
Kennedy’s vote, and with Bork voting against the plaintiff, Rehnquist 
would have gained the necessary five votes to control the Court.320 The 
dentist would not have been found to be in violation of the ADA, and the 
case would likely have been remanded to a lower court for 
reconsideration.321 
CONCLUSION 
The nomination of Robert Bork for a Supreme Court seat provoked 
perhaps the hardest-fought battle in American history over a judicial 
nominee. Twenty-five years after his rejection by the Senate, there is no 
doubt that Bork remained a magnet for controversy until—and even 
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beyond—his death, never bashful about asserting his views about the law, 
the judiciary, and the present direction of the United States. 
This review of Bork’s scholarship and jurisprudence reveals that 
Bork would have left an undeniable impact on the Supreme Court if he, not 
Kennedy, had replaced Justice Powell. Connecting the dots, it seems 
evident that Bork would have repeatedly held that a woman has no 
constitutional right to an abortion, probably ultimately leading to the 
overturning of Roe v. Wade. He would have fought for a more limited right 
to freedom of speech than Kennedy’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
recognizes, basing his decisions in this area largely on whether the speech 
in question was connected to the political process. 
He probably would have found that the Second Amendment does 
indeed include an individual’s right to bear firearms and use them for 
traditionally lawful purposes, and that this right extends to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. And he likely would have authored 
many outspoken opinions—both in the majority and in dissent—calling for 
strict limitations on applications of the Equal Protection Clause, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and other pieces of civil rights legislation. In particular, 
he would have demanded especially rigorous limits regarding the rights of 
women and homosexuals, the ability of universities and businesses to 
engage in affirmative action, and the power of the courts to interfere with 
policies set by private businesses—opinions that would have often differed 
from Kennedy’s decisions. 
Of course, this is all merely informed speculation. Yet it does 
provide a sense of what might have been if Robert Bork, rather than 
Anthony Kennedy, sat on the Supreme Court bench for the last quarter of a 
century. Whether these predicted results would have been as great as 
President Ronald Reagan believed, or as drastic as Senator Edward 
Kennedy feared, is solely up to you, the reader, to decide. 
More importantly, though, this Article illustrates the tremendous 
power that the President of the United States wields when appointing a 
justice to the Supreme Court for life, as well as the tremendous impact of 
the Senate’s ultimate vote to confirm or deny the nominee. The absence of 
this one man on the Supreme Court altered the course of history. America’s 
legal portrait over the last quarter of a century likely would have been quite 
different in key areas simply because of this particular judge’s vote. This 
underscores the ability of the Court to shape America’s laws, and the ability 
of one person to shape the overall direction of the Court. Today, at a time 
when the President of the United States could soon have the opportunity to 
nominate a new candidate for the Supreme Court,322 the magnitude of this 
decision is worth remembering. 
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